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Abstract: What are examples of successful companies innovating in services to create Product-
Service Systems that can command a price that exceeds the cost of capital and enhance,
protect, or replace the core products?
After a brief literature review and discussion of the challenges of classifying and defining
services and how they are related to products, this thesis provides a series of brief case
studies looking at how companies construct a services strategy that complements,
strengthens, or replaces their product strategy. Service-centric offerings are categorized
into three primary types: product-based (e.g. customization or repair), information-
based (e.g. telematics), and value-based (e.g. financing, leasing, or utilities). The thesis
focuses on positive examples, but some negative examples are also presented.
Summary conclusions on the nature and elements of successful product-services
strategy are also presented.
Primary research tools are corporate annual reports, SEC 10-K (and other) filings,
corporate websites, the Internet, and business research tools like Orvis, Hoovers, and
Lexis-Nexis. The thesis studies mainly (but not exclusively) publically traded US-based
companies with a strong emphasis on the automotive, heavy machinery, and
information technology sectors.
Thesis Advisor: Professor Michael Cusumano
Sloan Management Review Distinguished Professor of Management
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Introduction
What are examples of successful companies innovating in services to create product-service systems
that can command a price that exceeds the cost of capital and enhance, protect, or replace the core
products? Why should product-centric companies care about services? What happens when they
don't? This thesis attempts to wrestle with those questions.
After a brief literature review and discussion of the challenges of classifying and defining services and
how they are related to products in Chapter 1, this thesis provides a series of brief case studies looking
at how companies construct a services strategy that complements, strengthens, or replaces their
product strategy. For this thesis, service-centric offerings are categorized into three primary types.
Those three types represent the main chapters of the thesis:
" Chapter 2: Product-based services (e.g. retail sale, customization or repair). These are in
many ways what we would think of as the "classic" services. They tend to require lots of
product knowledge and their delivery has been traditionally more tied to the location of the
product, although - as we will see - that seems to be changing.
e Chapter 3: Information-based services. Here, we focus on telematics in the passenger car
and heavy equipment industries and see the tension in opposing business models: integrate
the service capabilities and move more slowly, or partner to move quickly but risk giving
away the future.
* Chapter 4: Value-based services (e.g. financing, leasing, or utilities). We look briefly at
financial services and then show some examples of more advanced forms where the
product disappears and the service for which we originally wanted the product is what we
see (and pay for).
A brief review and summary conclusions on the nature and elements of successful product-services
strategy are presented in Chapter 5.
How the Product-Service Systems Will Be Analyzed
This thesis primarily looks at publically traded, US-based companies. In some cases, the product
provider's entire value chain will be reviewed (e.g. independent dealer networks or service
organizations) but the primary focus is the product-centric companies themselves. Companies will be
studied by reviewing annual reports to shareholders, reviewing 10-K (and other) reports filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, using corporate websites, using the Internet, and using business
research tools like Hoovers, Orvis, and Lexis-Nexis.
The tools used with each case will vary. By their heterogeneous nature and the immaturity of Service
Sciences, there is (yet) no standard way to analyze, describe, and discuss services.
A Few Disclaimers, of Sorts
While Deere is my employer, no John Deere-proprietary sources were used in the preparation of this
thesis. All information, including that which is about or related to John Deere or its competitors
throughout this thesis is from either publically available sources or sources available to the MIT
community.
In general, I have tried to stay clear of companies like Apple and other companies where their story is
well documented and the topic of popular discussion, not because they are not interesting or relevant,
but because it is tough to say something new. As an illustration, iTunes is an exceptional example of a
product-service system that provides value for the whole platform. It elevates the value of the core
product, it allows Apple to make money off of competitive products, and generates incremental services
revenues through an automated system...everything you could want in a product-service platform, but
that notion is very well discussed elsewhere.
In some cases, there is a good deal of "set up" involved to explain the proper context on why what a
company is doing is interesting (e.g. Best Buy in Chapter 2). In others, practically none at all. That
makes the overall flow of the thesis a bit lumpy and uneven. I have tried to use appendices footnotes
and rigorous editing to help with that, but the end result is still not as neat as I would like. For what
ends up being an overall lack of cadence and rhythm to the thesis, I ask for your patience.
In a related notion, how to handle background information on the companies mentioned throughout
this paper was a challenge. For different readers, different companies will be familiar. The
organizational approach, based on types of services instead of companies or industries, which allows
companies to appear in more than one place exacerbated that problem as well. After going back and
forth, I settled on placing background information into an appendix (Appendix A) where I put some basic
vital statistics and then a little bit of commentary on the companies. None of the companies in the
paper are too esoteric, so I am hoping it will not be a problem for the flow of the main body of the
thesis. I have also included an Index of Companies, Products, and Services that lists each time that a
company or a product is mentioned.
Also, some theses come down to one big idea and take a very scientific approach to proving that single,
idea. That is not this thesis. This thesis is best thought of as a series of case studies of varying length
collected around some major themes. As Services Science evolves, more cohesive treatments will be
possible. I would be pleased if this thesis contributes to that evolution in some small way.
Chapter 1 - What Are "Services"?
Classifying and defining services is tricky. Most of our ideas and systems around accounting and
economics are pretty closed tied to things we can count easily, and since services usually don't fit into
that notion, they tend to be under-represented, under-measured, and under-understood by
corporations and governments. This chapter will try to provide a little bit of background on that subject
as well as propose some ideas on how to get past those limitations. This chapter will present a useful
definition for services as they relate to products (which they always do) and present a simple taxonomy
for services that will act as the framework for the rest of the thesis as well.
L1 - The Importance of Services
In developed economies, economists observe that services often account for 75% or greater of the
economy (Bryson et al., 2004). Figure 1 and Figure 2 below both show the trend that as economies
develop, the service sector becomes more and more significant. Additionally, in developed economies
like the US, practically all new job creation is service-based, as nine out of 10 new jobs are classified as
services (Bryson and Daniels, 2007).
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Perhaps even more significantly, on a global scale, the "2007 International Labor Organization reports
that for the first time in history, employment in services (40%) exceeds agriculture (39.4%) and
manufacturing (20.7%)" (Tang and Zhou, 2009).
For some large companies like GM and Ford, the majority - if not the entirety - of their profits in even
their healthiest of recent years have come from activities generally thought of as services like loans and
leasing (Cusumano et al., 2008).
There are at least three reasons why product companies should care about services (Oliva and
Kallenberg, 2003):
* Economic benefits: service can generate long, stable revenue streams that may be of a higher
margin than the products they complement (or replace).
* Customers demand it as a result of more complex products and more focused companies.
* Services can be harder to duplicate and may therefore create a more sustainable competitive
advantage than products alone.
1.1.1 - Why Do Companies Care About Services?
Many authors observe that as a product company matures, it may more naturally look to services
(Cusumano et al., 2008; Oliva and Kallenberg, 2003; Potts, 1988). In mature markets, products have
often devolved into a commodity status and their low margin may make services more attractive. In
other cases, even new companies and industries may need service capabilities to deploy (retail and
installation) or finance products.
Additionally, services are also more difficult than products for competitors - existing or would-be - to
reverse-engineer and copy. When Toyota and Nissan started manufacturing cars, they bought American
cars, tore them apart, and made their first products very similar to those (Cusumano, 2010). The
perishable, intangible, heterogeneous nature makes that much more difficult to do with services. It is
easy to put a micrometer to an engine and measure it. It is tough to put it to a process. As products
move toward commodity status and can only attract the cost of capital, more complex, less externally
measurable offerings in the market can be a source of at least survival and at best advantage.
In all cases, whatever the reason, there is a clear link between products and services. As such, it is
reasonable - perhaps important -for a product-centric company to develop and execute a strategic
approach to services. Otherwise, the plight of the American auto companies seems likely, where the
core products may actually lose money and the only thing profitable is the services.
1.2 - Economic Classification of Services
What are services in an economic sense? How do we classify them? While all agree that when totaled,
they represent the majority of developed economies, and have for decades, there is no consensus of
what "they" are. Colloquially, services have been thought of as "you can buy them or sell them, but you
cannot drop them on your feet."(Bryson and Daniels, 2007) While that is a useful heuristic, it is not
adequate for definition or classification'.
Economists traditionally speak of the economy as consisting of three sectors (Bryson and Daniels, 2007):
* primary (extraction - producing goods directly from raw materials)
* secondary (manufacturing - modification of material goods)
* tertiary (everything else)
As the tertiary sector, services are relegated to "what's left" and identified not by what they are, but
instead by what they are not. This definitional challenge goes all the way back to the founder of modern
economic thought, Adam Smith2 . In "Wealth of Nations," Book II, Chapter 3, he says the following
(Smith, 2004 - Original Publication 1776):
The labor of some of the most respectable orders in society is like that of menial servants, unproductive
of any value, and does not fix or realize itself in any vendible commodity which ensures after that labor is
past. In the same class must be ranked both of the gravest and most important, and some of the most
frivolous professions: churchmen, lawyers, physicians, men of letters, players, buffoons, musicians, opera
singers, and so on.
It seems that since Smith forward, services have just been the "other stuff" of the economy and because
of its "unproductive" nature they were deemed as not worth measuring. As early as 1952, the
'While the citations to the original sources are accurate and complete, it is also important to note that this section
relies heavily on the histories outlined in chapters 2 and 3 of Bryson & Daniels "The Handbook of Service
industries." For a more comprehensive treatment on this subject, please see that book.
2 Several authors observe that the view goes all the way back to Adam Smith. Bryson & Daniels are among them.
Economist Allan G.B. Fisher documents the limitations of the primary/secondary/tertiary definitions and
how they came to be and be accepted. Fisher indicates that their original purpose was more about how
economies grew than to indicate hard boundaries for rigorous classification. Fisher describes their
development in the following manner (Fisher, 1952):
World economic history, it was accordingly suggested in 1933 might be conveniently, if roughly, sketched
in three stages. After the primary and secondary stages, where effort was concentrated first mainly on
agricultural and pastoral and similar occupations, and then on manufacturing production and the
activities associated therewith, the richer economies emerged into a tertiary stage, where it was possible
to divert an increasing proportion of human time and effort and of capital equipment into the production
of goods and services which are not in the ordinary sense of the words to be included in either of the
categories of primary or of secondary production, namely, facilities for travel, amusements of various
kinds, personal and intangible services, flowers, music, art, literature, science, philosophy, and the like.
Since Fisher forward, there have been numerous efforts to improve and refine this classification system,
none of which have really "stuck."
But as is often the case, good is the enemy of great, and the "good enough" boundaries of primary,
secondary, and tertiary have just stuck, and with each passing decade the inertia of long-term economic
statistics makes them more entrenched.
Fisher's evolutionary view of economics can also be told in terms of a birthday cake (Pine and Gilmore,
1998):
e 100 years ago, a cake for a birthday was a collection of ingredients - commodities - that were
purchased by middle-class families for what would be a few dimes in today's costs.
* 50 years ago, a boxed mix - a product - costing five-to-ten times that of the raw materials -
would have been bought by that same middle class family to celebrate a birthday.
* 25 years ago, a middle-class family would have gone to the bakery - a service - for the same
birthday cake, paying again five-to-ten times as much.
* Today, that same middle-class family might go to Chuck E. Cheese 3 , Monkey Joes4 , or other
regional equivalents for a birthday "experience" at again five-to-ten times the cost, and the cake
may be thrown in for "free."
That evolution of the birthday cake is an excellent metaphor for the relationships between the primary
(materials), secondary (goods), and tertiary (services) economy. It can be portrayed graphically as in
Figure 3.
3 See http://www.chuckecheese.com/ for more information. Observed October 17, 2010.
4 See http://www.monkeyioes.com for more information. Observed October 17, 2010.
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Figure 3: From Commodities to Experiences (adapted from Pine and Gilmore, 1998)
Closely related to the efforts to classify services in the broader economy, substantial efforts to define
service have been undertaken as well. Most attempts to define services are very awkward and non-
intuitive. As one of many available examples, T. P. Hill proposes the following definition of a service: "a
change in the condition of a person, or of a good belonging to some economic unit, which is brought
about as the result of the activity of some other economic unit, with the prior agreement of the former
person or economic unit."(Hill, 1977) Hill's attempt is representative of the nature of most definitions,
and it leaves us wanting for something more workable, more easily applicable, and more intuitively
understandable. Several other awkward definitions of services could be presented here as well.
1.3 - A False Dichotomy
Perhaps the classification and definition problems stem from an attempt to enforce a false dichotomy
on goods OR services. These problems go away if we accept the notion that everything is - as proposed
by Tang & Zhou - a product-service system (Tang and Zhou, 2009). Said differently, there are no pure
products and there are no pure services.
Dr. Victor Tang & RuoYi Zhou propose the following definition of a service: "a solution performed for
consideration with a taktchronously co-produced product-HIP solution to create a stream of benefits."
The word, "taktchronous," represents the notion of delivering the product-service system at the right
tempo, closely related to the traditional service attribute of co-production. "IHIP" is an acronym
standing for some of the traditional attributes associated with services: Intangible, Heterogeneous,
Inseparable, and Perishable. Perhaps more significantly than the details of the definition, the definition
from Tang & Zhou asserts that a service in isolation simply does not exist. It is always a product and a
service delivered as a product-service system (Tang and Zhou, 2009). This fundamental assertion is the
key to unraveling the earlier classificational and definitional problems around services.
Professor James Teboul of INSEAD conveys a similar notion (Teboul, 2006). Teboul defines a "pure
product" as raw materials transformed with labor and capital to finished products. Teboul defines
"pure service" as customer who has an experience created with labor and capital and stays a customer.
Further, Teboul divides all businesses into "front stage" (which creates the service component) and
"back stage" (which produces the product component). Teboul further says, "There are no such things
as service industries. There are only industries whose service components are greater or lesser than
those of other industries. Everybody is in service."(Teboul, 2006) Tang & Zhou would agree.
Teboul elaborates and illustrates further by comparing three restaurants, as portrayed below in Figure 4.
For a fast-food restaurant (McDonald's in this example) nearly all of the value is product production -
what Teboul calls "back stage" - with very limited services. A traditional restaurant features much more
interaction with wait staff and ambience, providing something closer to a balance, but the food is still
produced "back stage." At the other extreme of the spectrum from a fast-food restaurant is a Japanese
steakhouse where the food is prepared "front stage" at the table as a part of the service experience. All
are tertiary sector businesses that are identical by traditional economic classifications. Tang, Zhou, and
Teboul would recognize them both as product-service systems with varying mixes of product and
service, or "front stage" and "back stage" in Teboul's parlance.
Front Stage:
Waiting lines and
self-service Front Stage:
Dining room Front Stage:
experience Dining room with
the chef cooking
and: serving
Back Stage:
Production lines
Back Stage:
Kitchen Back Stage:
Kitchen
McDonald's Gourmet Benihana-type
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Figure 4: Three Types of Restaurants. Source: Teboul, "Service Is Front Stage", 2006.
Paigrave Macmillan. Reproduced with permission of PaDgrave Macmillan
1.4 - A Porous Boundary, a Swinging Pendulum
Consider a bank in the 1930s. Every transaction is recorded and calculated by people with relatively
limited technology into a physical ledger. Loans are evaluated by people, and the decisions are
influenced by the strength of relationships. Money is received and dispensed by people. All of that
happens locally. It is very clear that such a business is service-intensive and each interaction is unique
and customized. Consider that same bank today. My ATM reads the checks I deposit, determines the
amount, and records the deposit to an electronic ledger. Basic loans are approved electronically with no
human interaction. My paycheck is deposited and divided between accounts electronically and
automatically. Besides the ATM, most of the information technology supporting all of this activity is
somewhere other than my local community. I find it hard to consider that level of automation and
technology as providing me a co-produced, customized service as the bank did in the 1930s. There now
appears an element of that experience that is productized through standardization and automation -
done "back stage."
What if we consider music? A century ago, if you wanted music at your party, you likely hired a band or
a musician. That was a clearly produced-as-it-is-consumed service. Fast-forward 75 years. In the 1980s,
for that same need, you could still hire live music, but you would very possibly use cassette tapes or
compact disks - same need, but now fulfilled with products. What if you wanted to mix that music?
Would you hire a DJ (a service) or buy a CD changer (a product)? Fast-forward again to the present.
Now perhaps the need would be filled using and iPod with thousands of songs (a product). Maybe
instead the need is met with Pandora, or other Internet-radio services where the music is customized
and the song choice is produced as it is consumed, yet at the same time, it is technology making the
choices (no human involvement) and the songs are pre-built building blocks. Product or service?
Consider the history of software. Software companies were originally providing entirely custom
hardware and software delivered as services. In the 1960s and 1970s IBM began standardize hardware
and software offerings, productizing them, now requiring much more limited configuration to make
them useful for customers. Now, IBM and other IT giants are looking at offering their products as
hosted offerings running "in the cloud." - as a service -to the customers.
What if we focus on traditional primary or secondary sector items? When my wife and I bought our two
most recent Honda's, they each came with three months of XM satellite radio as a part of the purchase.
If instead we would have bought GM cars, they would have come with OnStar pre-paid for one year6 . If
instead we had bought BMWs, they would have come with all routine service for the first four years or
50,000 miles of their lives included in the purchase price7 . A recent ad" for GM's Chevrolet Malibu
boasts "a transferable 100,000-mile/5-year Power train Limited Warranty" as well as "roadside
assistance and courtesy transportation programs." Products or services? What if we chose to lease the
cars instead of purchase them? Products or services?
The examples illustrate the artificial choice. In all case, the answer is "both." These are all product-
service systems, and in many cases, the balance shifts (and shifts back) over a long enough window of
time. These examples also point to how technology is central to blurring the lines. As labor is replaced
with technology, the offering seems to move toward the product end ("back stage" in Teboul's
language) of the spectrum and away from the service end.
s See http://automobiles.honda.com/cr-v/audio.aspx observed September 5, 2010
6See http://www.chevrolet.com/equinox/features-specs/ observed September 5, 2010
See http://www.bmwusa.com/Standard/Content/Owner/BMWUltimateService/Default.aspx, observed
September 5, 2010
8 Runner's World magazine, October 2010, pages 48-49
1.5 - The Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom Hierarchy
Before further exploring the relationship of the different types of product-service systems, it's necessary
to briefly discuss the difference between Data, Information, Knowledge, and Wisdom. The origin of this
hierarchy is not clear, but Ackoff9 is often attributed. For context of this thesis - grounded in systems-
thinking - that is certainly the most appropriate citation. Since these terms come up throughout the
thesis, getting common language now will be useful.
While used almost interchangeably in conversation and writing outside of the fields of information
theory and knowledge management, Ackoff and others proposed that Data, Information, Knowledge,
and Wisdom form what is variously portrayed as a hierarchy or a pyramid. The terms are generally
defined (Rowley, 2007) as portrayed in Table 1:
Table 1: D-I-K-W Hierarchy
Term Meaning Time Example(s)
Frame
Data Symbols void of context, Historical, GPS Coordinates
lending themselves Present
perfectly to algorithms
and programming.
Information Contextualized, Historical, Directions to
processed data. Present Panera Bread"
Answers the "who",
"what", and "when"
questions.
Knowledge Applied information and Historical, Where can I get a
data. Answers "how" Present good cup of coffee
questions. with a warm bagel
in front of a fire?
Wisdom (Some Evaluated Future- Where is a good
use the term understanding. "Why?" looking place to locate a
"insight") new restaurant?
Meaning and value both increase as we move up the "stack" from data to wisdom, as do the
requirements for human insight. Information technology and algorithmic or programmatic
9 Ackoff R. (1989) From data to wisdom. Journal of Applied Systems Analysis 16:3-9.
10 Panera Bread is a franchised bakery-caf6 throughout North America. For more information, see
http://www.panerabread.com/. Observed 09/12/2010.
interpretation is - similarly - less useful as we move further up the stack. Said differently, computers
manipulate symbols (data) very well and can deal very effectively with information. In some cases,
when knowledge can be classified adequately, computers can appear to provide value in that space as
well (e.g. Zagat" surveys make it possible for computers to "recommend" restaurants", or book-buying
patterns make it possible for computers to "recommend" book, music or movie titles" and appear to
move up the D-l-K-W hierarchy) but in general, knowledge and wisdom are still reserved for humans to
make actual decisions
1.6 - Service-Centric Elements of Product-Service Systems
Since this study is focused on the product-service relationship, it is useful to put some bounds on the
types of services considered; the intent is not to study product- or service-centric firms acting as holding
companies, where the services are strictly for financial value to the parent company and do not interact
with the product elements. Cusumano, Kahl, and Suarez use the following boundaries to define the
relevant product-service relationships: "activities that generally: (a) can be sold or given away separately
from the industry's 'physical' products; (b) relate directly to the industry's products and may even be
necessary to use those products, but; (c) are not part of the production process of the physical goods
themselves" (Cusumano etal., 2008). This paper will follow those same guidelines.
MIT Professors Olivier de Weck and Christopher Magee (de Weck and Magee, 2004) propose the
following classification for processes and operands in complex systems shown in Table 2. In support of
the table below, de Weck and Magee cite the following as examples of classes of operands:
e Matter: packages, vehicles, crude oil, animals, plants, water, memorabilia
e Energy: potential, electrical, kinetic, thermal, nuclear
e Information: news reports, email, TV shows, voice conversations, books (content), bits
* Value: stocks, bonds, cash, inventory, loans, credit, currencies, options
Zagat is a ratings company. See http://www.zagat.com for more information. Observed 09/12/2010.
12 As with Acura. See
http://www.acura.com/Features.aspx?mode=M DX&modelYear=201 1&context=Audio+ +Navigation#zagat revie
ws for more information. Observed 09/12/2010.
" As with Amazon.com. See http://www.amazon.com. Observed 09/12/2010. For more information about
Amazon.com, please see Appendix A.
Table 2: Types of Complex Systems (de Weck and Magee, 2004)
Process/Operand Matter (M) Energy (E) Information (I) Value (V)
Transform or GE Polycarbonate Pilgrim Nuclear Intel Pentium V N/A
Process Manufacturing Power Plant
Plant
Transport or FedEx Package US Power Grid AT&T International
Distribute Delivery System Telecommunication Banking System
Network
Store or House Three Gorge Dam Three Gorge Boston Public Library Banking
Dam Systems
Exchange or Trade eBay Trading Energy Reuters News Agency NASDAQ
System Markets Trading System
Control or Health Care System Atomic Energy International Standards US Federal
Regulate of France Commission Organization Reserve
The organization of the taxonomy of complex systems and the examples given imply that both product
elements and service elements can be derived from any of the operands, depending on the process
applied. This paper will base its organizational structure for product-service systems on the operands of
that taxonomy.
This thesis will endeavor to explore the product-service relationship by looking at specific companies
and trying to develop some generalizable principles of what would make a successful product-service
strategy. This paper reviews the service efforts of primarily companies that produce complex electro-
mechanical build-to-order products, but also draws on Information Technology and other sectors as
well. It presents brief case studies of particularly illustrative service offerings.
Based on de Weck and Magee, in this paper, the service-centric elements of product-service systems are
categorized into three major types:
* Product-based (e.g. customization or repair) -that is, material-based
* Information-based (e.g. telematics)
* Value-based (e.g. financing, leasing, usage-based services, or utilities)
1.6.1 - Product-Based Services
Product-based services are the "classic" services that we associate with a product's value chain.
Common examples include pre-sales consulting, configuration, wholesale or retail sale, customization,
installation, integration, maintenance, warranty, repair, and disposal. Product-based services are almost
always based on a high-level of knowledge about the product (Cusumano et al., 2008). They often have
traditionally involved physical proximity to the product, but do not necessarily require it, and that
heuristic is becoming less true. Some of these services may be included in the purchase price or appear
free, especially those that occur before the sales transaction. Others may not. These services may also
require a high-level of knowledge about the operating environment and/or competitive market of the
product as well. They can happen before, during, or after the product sale. The entire breadth of
product-based services from cradle to grave of the product is generally provided by a combination of
providers both within and outside of the corporate boundaries of the product company. Of the service
types presented in this paper, these product-based services are the most likely to be outside of the
product company, especially for products whose markets had to mature in an era of lesser
communication infrastructure, and for products where physical location is important for sales and
service (e.g. automobiles). These services will be addressed as two major types in this thesis:
* Retail-centric, studying on the changing nature of brick-and-mortar service delivery.
" Business-to-business, looking at the major strategies businesses can use to augment their
products with services.
1.6.2 - Information-Based Services
Information-based services draw on three primary sources of information:
* The operator
" The product itself
* The operating environment
They are differentiated from product-based services by either the volume of information to be
processed or the speed at which results are required to make the information valuable. The
requirement of speed and/or volume means that information-based services are not possible without
primarily automated processing. They normally create value by answering questions about
who/what/where/when. Product-based services are more likely to answer questions about "how" and
"why."
1.6.3 - Value-Based Services
Value-based services will be discussed here in three forms:
* "Traditional" value-based services like product financing where the product payment for the
product is more aligned with the consumption of the product (e.g. paying for a car over 60
months or leasing a server for three years).
" Product-servitization, where the product consumption is tied to the co-production of related
product-, information-, or value-based services and payment is tied to that co-production.
* Utilities where there is an servitized product that can leverage economy of scale or scope on the
product side, and potentially eliminate consumption-side underutilization of the product being
replaced.
1.6.4 - Energy-Based Services
To complete the de Weck/Magee taxonomy, there is an obvious question about energy-based service
elements. While they do exist, they often most naturally break down to either product-based services
(in the form of consultative knowledge about the product), or finance-based services. In early research,
I attempted to treat them separately, but it ended up feeling artificial.
1.6.5 - Hybrid Product-Service Systems
Hybrids (combinations of those three types of service elements) also appear throughout the thesis.
Common examples hybrid services include logistics, operations, or fleet management for customers
related to the core product element. In those cases, evidence of value-based, information-based and
product-based service elements are all evident. Other hybrids are online stores tightly integrated with
traditional brick-and-mortar stores or online publications tightly linked with traditional print media.
In most cases, there is one element that dominates and defines the product-service system. As an
example, Rolls Royce TotalCare (more colloquially known as "Power by the Hour") enables providers of
jet transportation to completely outsource the operations and maintenance of the system to Rolls Royce
and pay for it based on consumption. The most compelling feature is the pay-by-the hour nature of it,
and - for the purposes of this thesis - it would be treated as a value-based (financial) service.
Chapter 2 - Product-Based Services
As indicated in Chapter 1, product-based services are those services that are closely tied to the physical
product. In many ways, they are the "classic" services that we associated with a product, especially if
we think of a pre-World-Wide-Web world. Common examples include pre-sales consulting,
configuration, wholesale or retail sale, customization, installation, integration, maintenance, warranty,
repair, and disposal. Product-based services are usually based on a high-level of knowledge about the
product itself (Cusumano et al., 2008) and traditionally they often - although not always - involve
physical access to the product. There are a number of trends, some whose progress can be measured- in
months, and others that may be best measured in decades - that are changing the dynamics that have
traditionally tied product-based service delivery to the physical world. While there are many other
things that could be said about product-based services, this chapter will look at two main things:
* Studying the interactions between products and traditional brick-and-mortar-based service
delivery and how that is changing.
* Looking at different approaches to integrating products and services.
2.1 - Differentiating Product-Based Services
Though not exhaustive, Figure 5 represents many of the major types of product-based services in the
lifecycle of a product-service-system.
Figure 5: Product-Based Services for a Product-Service-System
It can be conceptually useful to classify them temporally into three major categories:
" Pre-sale
* Point-of-sale
* Post-sale
It is important to note that in some cases the culminating financial transaction may not actually be a
"sale" but could be a financing, leasing, or pay-to-use arrangement.
When using that simple organizational model, it is important to note that many of the elements after
the point of "sale" may have a small sales cycle associated with them as well, such as maintenance or
upgrade where parts may be required.
2.2 - Product-Based Services #Physical Services
As discussed in Chapter 1, product-centric services are those that are generally based on differentiated
product knowledge (as opposed to simply information or data). Said differently, while often true,
product-centric services are not necessarily tied to the physicality of the product or its delivery. The
powerful forces of digital information and other types of technological advancement are eroding the
physical world's hold on product-centric services from many directions.
At this point in the evolution of information technology, logistics, and just-in-time production methods,
there are fewer and fewer product characteristics left that support the need for traditional, physically-
based, brick-and-mortar service delivery infrastructure. It seems that the product-service systems that
will still support physical delivery have a higher mix of the following three attributes in the product:
* The product is difficult to encode in a timely and cost-efficient manner at point of consumption.
e The product is difficult to deliver in a timely and cost-effective manner without pre-positioning
inventory in a brick-and-mortar store.
* Complexity of product makes it difficult for customer to have enough confidence to commit to
consume without interacting with it.
Similarly, it seems that the digital, online world has the toughest time replicating the advantages of the
physical world in the following two areas:
* The entire retail experience, with sights, smells, tastes, touch, and complementary services can
be much more compelling in brick-and-mortar-delivered, product-based services
e Trust and relationships with service delivery staff and other patrons can be more compelling in
brick-and-mortar-based service delivery model
In the coming pages, the thesis will briefly review a number of trends, some of which are still quite
nascent, that are starting to change even these dynamics and further accelerate the de-coupling of
product-based services from tradition, physical delivery channels.
2.2.1 - Efficient Delivery: Video Rental: Redbox, Netflix, and Blockbuster
Video rental services like Netflix' 4 and Redbox' 5, stand in contrast to Blockbuster16 and its much more
traditional brick-and-mortar-based service delivery infrastructure.
While the ultimate delivery of the product element for these relative new-comers to the video rental
business relies on physical infrastructure (delivery services for Netflix' 7 and vending machines for
Redbox), all of the services before point-of-sale (or more accurately here, point-of-rental...more
generally, point-of-consumption) are provided using information technology in an online format". That
is possible for two primary reasons:
e Strong brand awareness and equity for the products was already created by the theater release
or television first-run.
* Established and accepted information standards assure the consumer that they will be able to
watch the DVD or Blu-ray on their system.
Those factors contribute to making the customer confident to commit to a transaction with an unseen,
untouched product. It also leverages a growing level of consumer confidence and comfort regarding
online transactions. In a situation like this, where movie companies have already spent as much as tens
of millions of dollars in marketing the titles, the physical store is able to offer very few advantages in the
form of product knowledge.
In the case of Netflix, the service results in delivery directly to your door. Netflix also recommends titles,
as would a brick-and-mortar retail associate, Redbox pushes the limits and confuses traditional
boundaries even more by having the customer pick up the video at the vending machine, making the
customer responsible for delivery and return while interacting with what amounts to an automated
store. Redbox charges $1/day for DVD rentals. Meanwhile, Blockbuster and their traditional brick-and-
mortar delivery model - which seems to have equated product-centric services with physical services for
too long'9 - has entered into chapter-11 bankruptcy proceedings 20 and charges $4 or more per DVD
rental.
According to Redbox's President Mitch Lowe in a 2009 interview in Forbes Magazine21, Redbox shares a
similar movie cost structure to that of Blockbuster for the media that both companies buy in order to
14 For more information about Netflix, please see Appendix A.
1s Redbox is a subsidiary of Coinstar. For more information on Coinstar, please see Appendix A.
16 For more information about Blockbuster, please see Appendix A.
17 Netflix does offer delivering entirely online as well, using a PC, gaming system, or some other endpoint. While
not contradictory, that example does not make the case for blurred lines as effectively, so it is not considered here.
That example is more on-par with the evolution of e-readers, which is addressed later in the chapter.
1 Redbox movies can also be selected at the vending machine using a PC-based interface to make the selection.
19 Blockbuster does have online offerings like Netflix, but it is generally accepted that they waited too long to
respond and enter into that market. There are also Blockbuster-branded kiosks that will be discussed briefly later
in the chapter, but they are owned and operated by NCR. Blockbuster missed that one too.
20 See http://www.nVtimes.com/2010/09/24/business/24blockbuster.html?emc=etal. Observed October 2, 2010
21 See http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/26/dvds-mitch-lowe-business-entertainment-redbox.html. Observed
October 4, 2010.
rent. Lowe indicated that - if anything - Blockbuster had more favorable terms. Since that article was
released, additional studios have banned Redbox from featuring their titles for the first 28 days. Despite
that disadvantage, Coinstar's Redbox subsidiary is growing rapidly and the parent company is profitable,
while Blockbuster is struggling to stay alive, and closing locations. The only apparent bright spot in the
Blockbuster story is its emerging kiosk-based business, where NCR licenses the Blockbuster name and
uses a business model very similar to Redbox. The NCR example, while it may help Blockbuster, only re-
enforces the notion that a kiosk is good enough for DVD rental and the brick-and-mortar element of
those product services is very near death.
That both Redbox and Blockbuster may ultimately loose to online providers is not the point. The point is
that brick-and-mortar infrastructure to physically deliver products to point-of-sale is no longer
necessarily required. DVDs are not the only products now being sold by kiosk, either. Progressively
more complex products like skin care22 and consumer electronics" are sold that way as well.
Complex, efficient logistics infrastructure coupled with robust communication networks, fierce
competition for market share and profits, and tech-savvy, tech-comfortable customers make it possible
and effective to centralize the storage, delay the production of many products, and ship to point of
consumption on-demand. Netflix and Redbox show that physical, local services now have very limited
protection created by the simple (traditional) physicality of the product. Customers don't miss the
"personal touch" of a retail clerk for simple transactions like a video rental.
2.2.2 - Efficient Encoding
2.2.2.1 - The Changing Face of Books
Books 4 have a much lower information payload than movies. An average book can be stored
electronically in less than 1MB of storage25 . A typical movie, by contrast, takes more than 1,000MB to
store in an acceptable format for home-theater-quality entertainment26 .That is a three orders-of-
magnitude difference.
2 Proactiv sells skincare products out of vending kiosks. To find one near you, see
http://www.proactiv.com/kiosklocator.php. Observed November 29, 2010.
2 Best Buy's vending kiosks are discussed briefly later in the chapter.
24 Music fell sooner to purely digital delivery. It's relatively small informational payload and abundance of efficient
and adequate encoding schemes coupled with a robust market for mobile (and therefore space-efficient)
consumption made it a natural. CD sales are in decline and services like iTunes are taking over. It would have
been easier to tell this story with music instead, but the growth of e-readers tells a similar story, there has been
much less written about it, and the stability of the book - until now - makes it very compelling.
2s Based on Amazon's Kindle technical specifications available at http://www.amazon.com/Kindle-Wireless-
Reader-3G-Wifi-Graphite/dp/B002FQJT3Q. Observed October 2, 2010. Technical specifications indicate that
Kindle will hold 3,500 books with 3GB of user storage. 3,O0OMB/3,500 books = 0.857 MB/book. Whether this
number is exactly accurate is not important, since we are looking at orders of magnitude in difference.
26 Based on the ISO standard for DVD's available at
http://standards.iso.org/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/c035641 ISO IEC 16448 2002(E).zip. Observed October
2, 2010. A single-layer DVD holds 4.7GB. Since only a single movie is generally stored on a DVD, it is reasonable to
assume it at least half-full. Even at 1GB, the movie would require 1,000 times more storage. Online sites like
Since the rise of moveable type, books have not changed much. Said differently, their product form has
been stable for half of a millennium. That is exceptional. The Sumerians were the first to use a
dedicated form of storage for the written word. They used clay, which could be inscribed when wet and
then dried for more permanent storage. When those clay "pages" were assembled and bound together,
an obvious fore-runner of the modern book appeared (Carr, 2010).
Early reading and writing were specialized skills, not generalized as they are today. No spaces, no
punctuation and no notion of upper and lower case made writing - and especially reading - more
difficult. It was well into the Middle Ages when the accommodations to the written word that we take
for granted and rely upon (i.e., mixed case, spaces, and punctuations) were generally accepted to make
reading easier for amateurs (Carr, 2010).
Those changes began to create the demand for easier access to the written word, but there was still a
great cost to its production. In the mid-1400s, Johannes Gutenberg developed his famed invention. In
the late 1400s, a scribe would charge one florin to make a single copy of Plato's Republic. For three
florins, over 1,000 copies could be printed (Carr, 2010) using the moveable type-based printing press.
The price of information transmission had dropped by orders of magnitude almost overnight. Since
then, the form of the book has not really changed. It is exceptional for a product form to remain that
static for so long of a period of time. With that much inertia in the product form, it clearly takes a
massive disruption for a new form factor to begin to emerge.
Enter e-readers.
An e-reader is a small, portable electronic device for reading and information storage that supports
many of the traditional attributes of printed forms (Schcolnik, 2001). In early 2010, Amazon S27 Kindle
was reported to hold an astounding 90% of the dedicated e-Reader market, based on "book" sales2 8.
The Kindle uses 3G cellular or 802.11 Wi-Fi networks to deliver books to a device purpose-built for long-
form reading and storage of what would have traditionally been books or paper-based periodicals.
Amazon now claims that Kindle "book" sales are out-pacing print sales for their top titles29. Barnes &
Noble makes similar claims regarding its "nook" e-reading platform, B&N's own, proprietary, dedicated
e-reader3 o
As with Netflix and Redbox, the physical infrastructure involved in delivering what was traditionally a
book is now minimal with e-readers. Because the actual informational content of a book is so small, it
can be delivered all the way to the point of consumption without a dedicated medium for transmission
YouTube do it in less space, but not at a generally acceptable resolution for long-form, movie-quality
entertainment.
2 For more information about Amazon, please see Appendix A.
28 See http://blogs.wsi.com/marketbeat/2010/02/16/analyst-amazon-e-book-share-to-falI-from-90-to-35/
Observed October 2, 2010.
29 See http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=176060&p=irol-newsArticle&lD=1486648&highlight=.
Observed October 27, 2010.
3 See http://www.fonerbooks.com/booksale.htm. Observed October 2, 2010.
like a DVD". A format which dominated information storage for readable information for centuries is
now possibly being disrupted and displaced in the period of years or decades.
2.2.2.2 - Products beyond Media
While it is clear that products that can easily be encoded into "pure" information like books and movies
are being disrupted, what about other product types? Are there still barriers to traditional physical
distribution? Yes, but those barriers cannot be assumed to be permanent for all applications.
Three-dimensional printing was patented by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1989 (Bak,
2003). As early as 2003, it was observed that three-dimensional printing systems, traditionally used for
rapid prototyping, could be used for low-volume or mass-customized production applications. On that
subject, David Bak said the following:
Rapid manufacturing - defined as the direct production of finished goods from a rapid
prototyping device - remains at present more of a goal than reality for industry. The application
of 3D printing technologies, however, promises to merge rapid prototyping capabilities with the
high-volume throughput of conventional manufacturing. Proponents believe that these
processes may soon lead the tool-less production of finished goods and the mass production of
individually customized parts (Bak, 2003).
Three-dimensional printers are able to produce products that have "the appearance, surface finish, and
physical characteristics of injection-molded ABS thermoplastic" (Bak, 2003). Additionally, automotive
parts producer Parker-Hannifin describes an example of running the output of a three-dimensional
printer mounted as a filter on a V8 automobile engine for 40 hours of service, collecting waste at 160"F
with no evidence of fatigue or degradation at the end of the 40 hours (Bak, 2003).
Three-dimensional printing systems are able to work with plastics, polymers, ceramics, metals (Sachs et
al., 1990), and even bio-materials (Pfister et al., 2004). Further, companies like Kovio - spun out of the
MIT Media Lab - are using Inkjet-type technology for printing printed silicon electronics - actually
printing a chip. Imagine a repair shop carrying little-to-no inventory except raw materials ("printer ink"
in a manner of thinking) and printing the needed parts to repair or maintain your toaster, shoe, phone,
or car. There is no doubt that today it sounds like science fiction, but 20 years ago, it sounded like
fantasy.
In the nearer term, testing the fit of a part with a model generated by a three-dimensional printer to
confirm the correct part to be ordered from a central location is also possible, which creates a way to
deal with complexity. Additionally, similar to the Parker-Hannifin scenario above, a limited-use part
could be fabricated using a "desktop manufacturing" or "desktop production" system while a
permanent part is ordered, eliminating the need to carry part inventory. Instead of streaming a movie
or downloading a song, we may find ourselves downloading a washer or a pair of bookends.
31 A broadband connection is defined by the FCC as in excess of 200 kilobits per second (See
http://www.fcc.gov/Daily Releases/Daily Business/2010/db0720/FCC-10-129A1.pdf. Observed October 2, 2010).
DVD-quality video exceeds that threshold.
Any product-based service today that has extensive capital tied up in physical infrastructure or inventory
must consider itself a potential target for disruption in the coming decades. Basic three-dimensional
printers are now sub-$1,000, and milling machines that were once $150,000 can now be bought for
$4,000 (Anderson, 2010). Commoditized, point-of-consumption, or at least point-of-purchase
fabrication is slowly becoming real across a progressively broader range of products. That change will
create massive disruption is how physically encoded products are delivered.
"Atoms are the new bits" (Anderson, 2010).
2.2.3 - The Changing Nature of Product Complexity
Complexity is "the amount of information necessary to describe the system effectively" (DeLaurentis,
2008). There are forces at work that are changing the nature of product complexity from multiple
directions.
2.2.3.1 - Managing Product Complexity by Integrating the Languages of Design and Manufacturing
Computer-Aided Design (CAD) and Computer-Aided Manufacturing (CAM) each trace their roots to the
1960s. Traditionally, the accepted ISO standard for describing mechanical parts in the world of CAD has
been ISO 10303, known as "STEP" (Xu and He, 2004). Computer Aided Manufacturing grew up following
a different standard, ISO 6983, which describes a language known as "G-Codes" which was developed in
a world for computer-driving machining equipment was very simple, with very limited processing
capabilities, and - therefore - required a very simple language. The different roots and different goals
of ISO 10303 and ISO 6983 have created a chasm between the digital worlds of design and
manufacturing.
A new ISO standard, ISO 14649, knows as "STEP-NC" integrates those two worlds (Xu and He, 2004) and
- for the first time - creates a common, standards-based language for both design and manufacturing.
Doing so reduces the stickiness of the product information and allows it to flow more easily across
departmental - and even organizational - boundaries. ISO 14649 is gaining wide acceptance across the
automotive industry (Xu and He, 2004). Figure 6 portrays the "before" and "after" of STEP-NC 32 .
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Figure 6: Comparing the flow of Information Before and After STEP-NC
2.2.3.2 - Pushing Differentiation as Close to the Customer as Possible, and Changing Complexity
The nature of product design has changed substantially over the last several decades. As design tools
and processes have matured, it has become progressively easier to de-couple product design from
32 MIT Professor Ed Crawley was the first I ever heard use the "Conceive-Design-Implement-Operate" (CDIO) as an
abstract product lifecycle.
product manufacturing and let the information flow without impedance to where it needs to be in the
supply chain. Companies like Zara33, the Spanish fashion company, embody the evolution with a robust
postponement strategy.
Zara uses a Flexible Manufacturing System (FMS) to help it achieve agility (Christopher, 2000). While
agility embodies many of the characteristics of lean, it is a distinct attribute. Agility is about a responsive
supply chain based on virtualization, process integration, market sensitivity, and a leveraged network.
Traditional manufacturing drove down price through off-setting massive set-up times by producing huge
runs of identical products to drive down unit prices. Lean manufacturing focused on reducing and
eliminating change-over and set-up time to make small (or no) batches of product competitive. Agile
takes lean concepts and applies them more broadly than manufacturing. It achieves agility by doing two
important things to its supply chain: it creates the earliest possible de-coupling point, and it creates the
latest possible postponement in manufacturing. Those ideas are portrayed graphically in Figure 7. De-
coupling drives as much of the backward supply chain as possible off of actual demand and not forecast
by allowing as much of the value chain as possible to work off of the same demand information. It's kan
ban on steroids. Postponement delays product differentiation as long as possible to reduce raw
material SKUs and match production to demand as quickly and accurately as possible.
Len Decoupling Agile
Customer
Postponement
Figure 7: The Agile Supply Chain (Christopher, 2000)
As research proves the value of agile supply chains, more companies - where applicable - are moving to
adopt this approach (Christopher, 2000) (Feitzinger and Lee, 1997). Central to the success of
postponement in material flows is reducing product complexity, making it possible to push
undifferentiated material as close to the customer as possible (Christopher, 2000). The Zara example is
significant in this context for two reasons. First, the most extreme case of pushing differentiation as
close to the customer as possible is desktop manufacturing and pure information services like e-readers,
both discussed earlier, and companies like Zara are creating more pressure across all product types for
that trend. Second, reducing overall product complexity further loosens the hold the physical retail
experience has on product services because it makes IT-based retail and distribution better equipped to
handle product comparisons. Said differently, simpler products can then be more easily compared and
understood using more technology and fewer people, more clicks and fewer bricks.
3 Zara is a part of the Inditex Group. For more information on the Iniditex Group, please see Appendix A.
2.2.4 - Trust and Relationships
While the online world has a long, long way to go, there is some evidence that it is starting to make in-
roads into the areas of trust and relationships traditionally reserved for the brick-and-mortar world.
2.2.4.1 - Web-Based Recommendation Agents
While new standards and agile supply chains reduce product complexity and increase information flow
in the supply chain, the evolution of online retail makes it - at the same time - more capable to handle
it. This too erodes at the physical world's hold on product-based services. As customers become more
and more comfortable with recommendation agents in their online experience, the role of "trusted
advisor" traditionally played by a clerk or sales associate in a brick-and-mortar store comes under fire.
On the subject of online recommendation agents - here, "RAs", "[tihere exists ample theoretical and
empirical evidence that people respond socially to RAs and that they perceive RAs as exhibiting human-
like characteristics (e.g., benevolence and integrity). Although human properties do not intrinsically exist
in RAs, the salient fact is that they are perceived as such by those who interact with them" (Wang and
Benbasat, 2008). Web agents are able to begin to replace the traditional role of the subject matter
expert. As such, product complexity's tie to the physical world continues to be eroded by online
retailers with services and increasing robust and effective algorithms based on larger and larger
information sets for recommendations, as with Amazon.com and Netflix (also called "shopbots" or
"infomediaries" (Swaminathan, 2003)),
Ben Shneiderman proposes this definition of trust: "the positive expectation a person has for another
person or an organization based on past performance and truthful guarantees. Trust is about
expectations of the future. It accrues to individuals and organizations due to their previous good works
and clear promises" (Shneiderman, 2000). Based on that definition, the success that recommendation
agents find is a virtuous cycle, where past success increases the likelihood for future success. That
means that the ability to replace human sales associates with expert systems can (and likely will) get
stronger in the future. As reputation management systems and peer reviews are more strongly
incorporated into ecommerce systems, the virtuous cycle continues.
Additionally, online sites that use chat sessions with support staff, or offer the opportunity for someone
to call you, or avatars that answer your questions, further move the digital world into the world of being
able to slowly build trust and create relationships in an online format, slowly eroding at the brick-and-
mortar service delivery model.
2.2.5 - Experiential Retail
Of the three product attributes and two brick-and-mortar store attributes, where physically delivered
product-based services seem to have an advantage, the only one where Information Technology has not
been proven to make some gains against brick-and-mortar is the customer experience, "experiential
retail" as it is often called. That is not to say that there cannot be a good online experience. It is to say
that there are still some things that highly automated, IT-driven product-based services cannot
reproduce. To be clear, the online retail experience does matter and is the subject of significant
research in both academia and industry, but the ability to deliver complex and compelling experience as
a context for the retail experience is an area very difficult for the pure online retail experience to match
when compared to brick-and-mortar done well. While the bar will continue to be raised, the
combination of pleasing sights, aromas and complementary services can continue to be an advantage
for the foreseeable future for the physical world.
2.2.5.1 - Impact of Music
Music has been empirically proven to positively impact several aspects of product-based services. David
Allan reviewed 29 papers on the impact of music on retail and concluded that music can make a positive
impact on the perception of and interaction with sales staff. Music has also - in some cases - been
proven to increase both willingness to buy as well as total amount spent. That is a compelling
advantage for traditional delivery channels (Lowrey, 2008).
2.2.5.2 - Smell
It is widely believed that sense of smell is the most compelling of the senses to evoke memories. Crader
and Zaichkowsky observe that "fragrance is processed by the limbic system, the most primitive part of
the brain, and place where immediate emotions are experienced. Therefore if a retailer is able to create
a connection between a particular scent and the brand or product, any time the scent is present in the
consumer's daily life, they will remember the store, and the positive emotions tied to the previous
experience with it." (Crader and Zaichkowsky, 2007) That is a compelling advantage for the physical
world.
Martin Lindstr6m's popular book, "Brand Sense," tells of other olfactory examples as well: "Recently
Mitsubishi's ad agency placed a fragrance ad in two major newspapers that simulated the leathery 'new
car' smell. The result: the company's Lancer Evo X sold out in two weeks and the car company's sales
increased 16 percent even in a recession." (Lindstr6m, 2005) He gives other examples of the physical
world, like Bloomingdale's pumping the smell of Johnson & Johnson's baby powder into their stores, and
the positive association that consumers have with the smells of stores like Abercrombie & Fitch, and
Hollister.
2.2.5.3 - Touch
The ability to touch a product, as you can at a brick-and-mortar store, has been proven to help as well.
"Haptic senses appear to moderate the relationship between product and experience and judgment
confidence." (Crader and Zaichkowsky, 2007) That also fits our common sense. It's much easier to
imagine and understand yourself using and enjoying a product that you can touch and with which you
can interact.
2.2.5.4 - The Store Itself
Just having a store has been proven to make a limited difference, even when that store is not easily
accessible to potential consumers. It seems to provide some sort of legitimacy no matter what. Beyond
that, it also makes it easier to exploit other potential advantages, like positive experiences with service
providers, a positive brand association, and ease of product exchange (Brady and Darke, 2008).
2.2.5.5 - Adding Them Together
Crader and Zaichkowsky mentioned earlier further assert that "using both scent and music to
complement the other atmospheric elements, marketers will be able to create a carefully controlled
store environment that gives customers a pleasing experience." (Crader and Zaichkowsky, 2007) They
further point out that the providers where the service element is much larger than the product element
have been perfecting the experience for a long, long time, and that retailers are now learning the
atmospheric conditions that galleries, salons and restaurants - places where we spend hours instead of
minutes - have been perfecting for decades, perhaps centuries.
2.3 - What Is All of This Doing to Product-Based Services?
Five attributes where traditional brick-and-mortar-based product-centric services have an advantage
over online systems were identified earlier in this chapter - three product attributes and two service
delivery attributes. It is useful to look at those five attributes across the range of product-based
services. Here, they are arranged temporally as in Figure 5 at the beginning of this chapter. Table 3 and
Table 4 show four of them are being eroded by these trends in various ways, indicated by "minus" signs.
Also indicated are the experiential advantages of brick-and-mortar, indicated with "plusses."
Table 3: Summarizing the Impact of Trends on Brick-and-Mortar-Based Service Delivery - Negatives
Impact on Brick-and-Mortar
Domain Attribute Example Comment
Netflix
delivery,
Redbox
vending - - - Sale element of "maintenance"
"no touch" "upgrade", and "repair" services are
The product vs. Block- considered a part of initial "sale" in
element of the buster scoring.
product-service- 3-D
system is difficult to printers
encode in a timely beginning
and cost-efficient of "desktop
manner at point of mfg"
consumption. revolution?
The product
element of the
- prod uct-service-
system is difficult to
deliver in a timely
and cost-effective
manner without e-readers Delivery element of "maintenance",
pre-positioning vs. "upgrade", and "repair" services are
inventory in a brick- traditional considered a part of intial "delivery" in
and-mortar store. books scoring.
Step-NG:
Better info
flow Reducing complexity barriers makes a
Complexity of throughout difference where ther is product
product element supply selection to be done, including upgrade,
makes it difficult for chain repair, and maintenance
customer to have
enough confidence Zara: Reducing complexity barriers makes a
to commit to Postponem - difference where there is product
consume without ent and de- selection to be done, including upgrade,
interacting with it. coupling repair, and maintenance
Online
Trust and chat,
relationships with avatars,
.a service delivery call-back
staff and other begin to
patrons can be emulate
2 more compelling in brick-and-
brick-and-mortar- mortar
based service service Starts to emulate higher-touch service
delivery model elements delivery.
Total Negative Impact of Product
and Service changes on brick-and- 3 4 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 1
mortar delivery of product-based
services
Table 4: Summarizing the Impact of Trends on Brick-and-Mortar-Based Services Delivery - Positives
Impact on Brick-and-Mortar
Domain Attribute Example Comment
The entire retail
CU experience, with i-tr>~ wt In-Store Proven to make a difference at several
sights, smells', ui~ i tsMsel s points in retail cycle.
tastes, touch, and
complementary + + + + + . + + . + Proven to cause stronger, more immediate
services can be Smell emotional response.
0)~~~oit invie r tai cycle.I I I
much more + + + + + Proven to mediate judgment related to
compelling in Touch purchases.
brick-and-mortar- Brick-and-
based product- mortar + + + + + + + + + +
based services itself
Service Delivery
Positive Impact 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 3
From Table 3 and Table 4, we can learn some useful things. The attributes of service delivery - trust,
relationship, and experience - tend to apply more broadly than the product attributes, as indicated by
the plusses and minuses going more end-to-end in the "Service Delivery" part of the tables. As was
mentioned earlier, they are also not tied to product type, so whether an advantage for bricks or clicks,
once it is mastered, it should more easily ported or scaled to new products or new classes of products.
There is an important lesson there for companies focused on physical delivery.
It's important to note that all of these trends are double-edged swords. Brick-and-mortar done well is
an opportunity to create a compelling service delivery with which online cannot (any time soon) really
compete. On the other hand, brick-and-mortar done poorly may send consumers online faster than
anything else. Similarly, one problem with a Redbox vending machine may guarantee Blockbuster or
other brick-and-mortar rental stores a customer for a long time to come. But the point is bigger than
any one plus or minus in Table 3 or Table 4. The bigger picture is that there is evidence of a major
disruption to brick-and-mortar service delivery that is much broader than buying a book at Amazon.com.
If that is the case, are there examples of companies that are applying these ideas and winning?
2.4 - Best Buy
The electronics retailer Best Buy34 is an example of a company leveraging many of the trends identified
in this chapter3 s. If these are winning strategies, then that should be evident in their market
performance.
2.4.1 - Highly Integrated Multi-Channel Service Delivery
Best Buy has among the most robust multi-channel strategies in retail. They have three delivery models
in the United States:
* Brick-and-Mortar stores
e Online presence
e Kiosk vending machines
Among their brick-and-mortar stores, they also have different footprints, including small "Best Buy
Mobile" stores in the mall and traditional big-box stores near to or anchoring retail complexes. The lines
between the three channels are such that consumers can affect purchase, pick-up, and return (if
necessary) transactions in practically any combination. Online purchases can either be delivered or
picked up at a convenient brick-and-mortar store, often eliminating the delivery charge. Online
shoppers can also check inventory of favorite stores and reserve in-stock items for pick up. While kiosks
are not integrated to the purchase/pick-up interoperability of the brick-and-mortar and online stores,
returns or exchanges for all three channels can be made at the brick-and-mortar stores, which
overcomes a major concern for online shoppers: how to handle returns. While they are not broadly
deployed, kiosk vending machines can be found at major airports and sell - among other things -
products geared to the needs of travelers, like personal music systems, headphones, chargers and travel
adapters.
2.4.2 - Experiential Retail
Best Buy's brick-and-mortar stores are bright, clean, and have a consistent appearance. They feature
"Best Buy radio" and "Best Buy TV" as the in-store music and video featuring content that can be bought
in the store. Gaming systems are set up to enable customers to try them. TVs are set up allowing you to
see the pictures. Stereo systems, digital cameras, computers, and even printers are similarly available
for test drives in the store.
2.4.3 - Geek Squad and Other Product-Based Service Elements
Companies like wal*mart and Target are expanding their electronics departments and improving their
brand selection, allowing them to compete more and more directly with stores like Best Buy. As they
do, Best Buy has to respond to pricing pressures, and it becomes more difficult (impossible?) to be
adequately profitable on the hardware sale alone. To continue to create value in product-based
services, Best Buy has started to capture more of the product service delivery chain by buying and
3 For more information about Best Buy, please see Appendix A.
3s Unless identified otherwise, the content regarding Best Buy is based on personal experience.
integrating the Minnesota-based Geek Squad into Best Buy, making them available for product-based
services from delivery all the way through to disposal.
By doing so, they are doing the most to capitalize on the after-sales services chain where the value of IT
automation has been much lower (since those services lend themselves much less to automation
because they are not as standardized). In fact, they are creating product-based service opportunities as
far as they can in the product value chain by providing recycling kiosk for e-waste (no matter where it
was purchased) in many stores and hauling away old appliances when they deliver new 6 .
Best Buy also makes gift cards available for online music services or pre-paid cards to download some
releases available for sale, integrating them with CDs, DVDs and Blu-ray discs for sale. Best Buy also
owns napster.com, one of the original digital delivery music brands, in an attempt both to enrich the
online, multi-channel experience and to stay connected with the changing nature of information
delivery.
Best Buy also generates revenue by selling extended product warranties that extend beyond those of
the product companies.
As a result of all of those efforts, services revenue (not including credit services, which are administered
by HSBC 3 8 ) for FY2010 was six percent of total revenue, and 12 percent of revenue in Best Buy's more
rapidly growing European operations3 9.
2.4.4 - Blurring the Lines the Other Direction
Best Buy also blurs the lines of product and service the other direction by selling exclusive house brands
including Dynex, Init, Geek Squad, and Rocketfish.
2.4.5 - Leveraging Complexity
Best Buy also leverages the product complexity of mobile phones by setting them up so that a potential
customer can experience their weight, look, and feel, as well ask questions, and buy a wide range of
(very profitable) accessories. PDAs and mp3 players have also been sold at Best Buy using that same
format in years past.
2.4.6 - Best Buy Is Doing the Right Things. Is It Working?
The evidence is that Best Buy is doing what this paper would propose as the best things they can do to
enhance their position. They are improving the pre-sales through sales and distribution service
elements with a highly integrated multi-channel strategy. They are creating a positive, pleasing, and
memorable retail experience. They are pursuing a services strategy that extends all the way through the
product-based services value chain from pre-sales consulting on complex products to facilitating
36 See http://www.bestbuy.com/recycling. Observed October 25, 2010.
3 See http://www.napster.com - "a Best Buy company." Observed October 25, 2010.
38 See http://www.bestbuy.com/site/null/Credit-Cards/pcmcat102500050032.c?id=pcmcat102500050032.
Observed October 25, 2010.
39 Source: Best Buy 2010 Annual Report.
disposal, and integrating the disruptive nature of digital encoding by buying napster.com. The obvious
and important question is whether or not these steps are making a difference.
While it is always difficult to identify causality without a longer lens of time, there is strong evidence
that what this thesis is recognizing as best practices are paying off. Figure 8 shows that Best Buy has
out-performed both their peer group and the market for the last five years40.
COMIPARISON OF 5 YEAR CUMULATIVE TOTAL RETURN*
Among Best Buy Co., Inc., the S&P 500
and the S&P Retailing Group
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Best Buy Co., Inc. $100.00 $158.00 $136.43 $127.81 $86-96 $11L84
S&P 500 100.00 108-40 121.38 117-01 66.32 101.88
S&P Retailing Group 100.00 111-97 124 14 98-88 66.82 11487
* Cumulative total return assumes dividend reinvestment.
Figure 8: Best Buy, the S&P 500, and S&P Retailing Group Over 5 Years
Over that same five-year period, comparable store sales have increased each year except 2009, during
the recession41 . The most obvious and compelling evidence, however, is that their biggest competitor,
Circuit City4 2, declared bankruptcy in 2008. A New York Times article summarized it well (Rosenbloom,
2008):
In the 1980s, Circuit City was one of the nation's strongest retailers. But then came a series of
critical missteps. "In the 1990s, they signed cheap real estate leases in inferior locations, and
sealed their fate doing that," Ms. Widlitz said. Many of the spaces were too big and made for an
uninviting shopping experience. As its fortunes worsened, Circuit City laid off thousands of its
most experienced salespeople last year to save money, killing morale at the stores and angering
customers.
40 Source: Best Buy 2010 Annual Report.
41 Source: Best Buy 2010 Annual Report.
42 For more information about Circuit City, please see Appendix A.
Meanwhile, analysts said, its archrival, Best Buy, secured better real estate, offered better
service and adapted more quickly to a difficult marketplace for electronic goods.
Best Buy also appears to be gaining market share, even with wal*mart and Target competing more
directly 4 3 in their core market of consumer electronics. It is tough to imagine more compelling indirect
evidence of a successful strategy than (1) gaining against wal*mart and (2) taking out your biggest direct
competitor. It will take time to know the real causes of Best Buy's apparent success, but their present
strategy which incorporates much of what is discussed here appears to be working well.
2.5 - Tying It Together: Trends in Consumer-Oriented Product-Based
Services
As is indicated above, at this point in the evolution of information technology, logistics, and just-in-time
production methods, there are fewer and fewer product characteristics left that support the need for
traditional, physically-based, brick-and-mortar product-based service delivery infrastructure.
Technology, logistics, and just-in-time/lean methods continue to erode the first two (efficient delivery
and efficient encoding). The last two (experience, and trust & relationships) are highly de-coupled from
the products themselves and can become easily ported to new product-service systems.
A personal example helps illustrate the point. Our dishwasher is 15 years old. It worked fine, but the
gasket around the door leaked if we ran it twice in a row. With the holidays coming (as I write this) and
my wife an excellent cook, I wanted nothing to stand in the way of cooking process so I ordered another
gasket. I used one website to help me figure out where to find the model number for the dishwasher,
another website to help me figure out the part number for the gasket for this particular model of
dishwasher, and compared the price on three different sites, two of which had it in-stock for next-day
shipping. Had I needed to, I could also watch a YouTube44 video to help me understand how to install it.
Throughout that process, things that traditionally would have been implicit knowledge reserved for
service professionals are now readily available information that let me wander my way through a
relatively craft-based industry - appliance repair - and do the job.
The best multi-channel service delivery systems let the consumer choose how much "front stage" and
how much "back stage" (to refer back to the language of James Teboul from Chapter 1) we each want at
every step of the process. And, even in the cases where physical delivery of the service may be required
or preferred, it can often be brought the consumer's location, as do many vehicle window repair
services, eliminating the traditional service bay experience45. Even traditional artisan-based services like
shoe repair leverage a strong logistics network to get materials to the point-of-consumption in a timely,
cost-effective manner. It seems that there simply are no more "pure" physically based product-centric
43 See http:/blogs.reuters.com/shop-talk/2010/01/08/check-out-line-best-buys-claims-on-market-share-gains/.
Observed October 25, 2010.
44 See http://www.youtube.com for more information...about YouTube in general, not my dishwasher. Observed
October 2, 2010.
4s See Safelite Autoglass at http://www.safelite.com/ as an example. Observed October 2, 2010.
service delivery channels. In those cases the physical delivery of the service still exists, but it is - without
question - slimming down from what it traditionally has been.
All of these changes can be seen as a blessing or a curse. Change and disruption are hard because they
created the opportunity (inevitability?) for new winners and losers in markets. It is what Schumpeter
called the "gales of creative destruction." (Schumpeter, 1942) While Redbox and Netflix begin to
prosper, Blockbuster struggles. As Best Buy adapts and improves, Circuit City is left behind.
Figure 9, Figure 10, Figure 11, Figure 12, and Figure 13 attempt to wrap some of this up and portray the
ideas graphically. Figure 9 portrays the idea that consumers have a certain level of experience that they
expect in return for what they spend...that creates a price-experience curve. If something is above or to
the left of that line, a consumer will likely pass on it. Figure 9 shows two companies at the extreme of
the value spectrum, wal*mart, and Tiffany's, as representative of what the market has conditioned
consumers to expect as a baseline of consumer experience. A straight line may not accurate, and the
line is likely different for each person, so this is just a notional representation of the "average" price-
experience trade-off the market expects at a point in time.
Very High Consumer's Required Tiffany's
Value Curve
Cost
Jl/wal*mart
Very Low//
"1Bare Bones" Experience Luxury, differentiated
Figure 9: Price- Experience Curve, Part I
Figure 10 shows three companies able to meet the price-experience frontier of the market - Best Buy,
Blockbuster, and Circuit City - at a point in time. Likely, when they were new firms, they exceeded that
frontier (below and to the right of the line) or they never would have made it. In a mature, stable
market, we would expect to find that most competitors were along this line, perhaps at different point
based on how the differentiate their products, but along the line.
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Figure 10: Price-Experience Curve, Part Il
Figure 11 shows what it would look like as two firms do not keep up with the ever-increasing
expectations of the market and begin to fall behind the price-experience frontier that consumers expect.
Maybe they don't re-invest in the look of the stores. Maybe they begin to open at lesser locations to
save on rent or perhaps get rid of their most capable (and therefore most expensive) sales staff which
depletes the quality of the interaction with consumers. Maybe they outsource their web presence while
competitors generate a higher level of integration between the brick-and-mortar and online experiences
by developing it in-house. Maybe they fail to innovation in new services. Somehow, they fall behind
what the market expects and drift above and to the left of the line.
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Figure 11: Price-Experience Curve, Part III
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Figure 12 shows two possible reactions by competitors to a firm with a deteriorating price-experience
proposition:
* Redbox creates a drastically different consumer experience from the incumbent Blockbuster
with an experience that may be slightly lesser in quality (usually through a combination of
automation and consumers doing a little more of the work) but markedly different in price
structure. Users migrate.
* Best Buy attacks Circuit City not by focusing on price but on an improved experience, moving
ahead of the price-experience frontier to have a differentiated experience from the
competition. Users migrate.
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Figure 12: Price-Experience Curve, Part IV
Figure 13 shows the market re-calibrating its expectations and Redbox and Best Buy now just good
enough, and ripe for attack themselves.
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Figure 13: Price-Experience Curve, Part V
2.6 - Some Other Important Examples - Beyond Consumers and Retail
Beyond these trends and how they are impacting the consumer-centric, retail side of product-based
services, it is useful to observe a few other notable companies in product-based services. In the
remainder of this chapter, we will look at three of the greatest companies in American business: John
Deere 4 6, GE, and IBM4 7. Each are iconic innovators that have defined and redefined their respective
fields over the last century48.
Additionally, studying the services strategy of either IBM49, or GE50 -would be a thesis-worthy project
unto itself. That, however, is not the spirit of this thesis. These two particular companies represent
much of the best thinking of what companies with roots in products can do with services. With that in
mind, I will address each of them briefly, pointing out what is special about their approaches, and not
cataloging what they offer.
46 For more information on John Deere, please see Appendix A.
47 As I was finishing up my thesis, I saw an interesting show on CNBC about franchising called "Behind the Counter:
The Untold Story of Franchising" that mentioned Procter & Gamble's new franchising efforts with Tide Dry
Cleaning and Mr. Clean Car Washes. As another great American business, I considered adding them to this section
as well, but after studying the offerings a bit from what information is available, I think it is more a story of
leveraging a recognizable brand than anything else because I don't believe there is much overlap in the actual
consumer products and their industrialized counterparts that would be required. Over time, it may prove that
they are adopting what we would describe here as the IBM model and are ceding commoditized products in favor
of higher-value services.. It is too early to tell. For more information about the P& G franchise businesses, please
see http://www.tidedrycleaners.com and http://www.mrcleancarwash.com. Both observed December 23, 2010.
For more information about the show on CNBC, please see
http://www.cnbc.com/id/39911155? source=vtyl franchising I &par=vty. Observed December 23, 2010.
48 For John Deere, it's actually closer to two centuries.
49 For more information about IBM, please see Appendix A.
50 For more information about GE, please see Appendix A.
2.6.1 - John Deere
Before we look at GE and IBM, it is important to contrast what they are doing with traditional supply
chain integration: acquiring the vertical elements of an existing supply chain. At the most basic level, a
company acquires either forward (toward the customer and the end-product) or backward (toward the
suppliers and ultimately raw materials). We can point to two examples of forward supply chain
integration in the recent history of John Deere. We'll use those as a baseline before looking at more
advanced strategies.
2.6.1.1 - John Deere Construction and Nortrax
In 1999, John Deere acquired Neff Machinery Inc. from the Neff Corporation. That acquisition was the
first (of many) for the Nortrax division of Deere. According to a New York Times article that reported
the acquisition, the purpose of Nortrax is "to run Deere's construction equipment dealers."' Of the 402
locations that sell John Deere construction equipment today, Deere's 2009 SEC 10-K report indicates
that Deere owns "some" of those locations. A Google maps search finds 194 locations in North America
with the name, "Nortrax." 52
Here we have a basic example of forward supply chain integration. While Deere does not hide their
ownership of Nortrax, they do not advertise it (For example, there is no mention on the Nortrax website
of Deere ownership5 3) and their plans for the on-going acquisitions54 are not publically discussed. While
there may be deeper plans, from externally available evidence, it appears to be a straightforward effort
to capture more of the revenue between Deere and their customers by internalizing a part of the
services value chain to capture existing value. That is the most basic kind of services integration, and it
can deliver value to shareholders (and other stakeholders), especially in markets where the service
delivery footprint is stable and not growing.
Best Buy's extended warranty program and house-brand products - both mentioned earlier - are
examples of the same approach With house-brand, private-label products, they are exhibiting
backwards integration, and with the extended warranties, they are integrating forward.
2.6.1.2 - John Deere Landscapes and LESCO
As another example of forward supply chain integration, in 2007, John Deere acquired the landscape
concern, LESCO. According to a New York Times article at the time 55, LESCO operated "more than 300
stores, selling products including seeds, chemicals and fertilizer for professional lawn maintenance
companies like golf course operators. LESCO was rolled into John Deere Landscapes and Deere's "One
Source" strategy to meet all the needs of golf course maintenance professionals. One Source brings
together products from the Ag & Turf division, services from John Deere Landscapes, and financial
services from John Deere Financial into one integrated offering.
51 Source: November 13, 1999 New York Times, Section C; Page 3; Column 1; Business/Financial Desk. Byline: Dow
Jones.
52 See http://maps.google.com. Observed October 22, 2010.
s3 See http://www.nortrax.com. Observed December 5, 2010.
s4 A Google or Lexis-Nexis search shows that it has been on-going.
ss Source: February 20, 2007 New York Times, Section C; Column 5; Business/Financial Desk; Pg. 2. Byline: Reuters.
Beyond "just" capturing value as Deere is doing with Nortrax here, you see Deere trying to create new
value for customers by creating new synergies and eliminating interface inefficiencies through stronger
integration than is evident with Nortrax.56 It is important to note that these visions to create new value
are not easy, and very often do not meet initial expectations. In this case, John Deere's 2009 Annual
Report lists $289.2M write-off as from recognizing a goodwill impairment related to the above-
mentioned LESCO acquisition.
2.6.2 - IBM Global Services
IBM's roots are as a machine company, as the name implies. They commercialized business computing
in the 1960s and 1970s, the heyday of the mainframe. Since the PC revolution of the 1980s, IBM has
had to take a different approach and diversify its business model. According to their 2009 Annual
Report57, IBM Global Services (IGS) now represents 42% of IBM's revenue. That business unit did not
exist until the 1990s (Chesbrough and Spohrer, 2006) as IBM had to evolve their business model to cope
with a radically different price-performance curve and type of user needs in the PC world that IBM had
commercialized. It is important to note the services are the least profitable (when considering gross
margins) of the IBM divisions, as shown in Table 5. Even hardware has a higher gross margin. That is
primarily because IBM has shed much of the commodity hardware business. Services (between Global
Technology Services and Global Business Services) represent well over 50% of total revenue and 42% of
income. Just nine years ago, IBM hardware sales were 24% of income. IBM's direction is clear.
Table 5: 2009 Performance of IBM Divisions
IBM Division Gross Margin Revenue ($M) Revenue (%) Income (%)
Global Technology Services 35.0% $37,347 39%
Global Business Services 28.2% $17,653 18%
Software 86.0% $21,396 22% 42%
Systems & Technology 37.8% $16,190 17% 7%
Global Financing 47.5% $2,302 2% 9%
Other $869 1% 9%
As a computer systems company, IBM built exceptional knowledge of how business is done; in order to
automate business processing, it first had to be understood before it could be digitized. In their near-
monopoly status of the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s for industrialized data processing, they were able
to bundle that knowledge with the products. The massive shift in pricing structure since the PC era
began in the early 1980s made it no longer possible to make those consultative services a part of the
hardware. To be clear, IBM still takes good care of their customers and is generous with their expertise,
but in building the world of business computing, they had developed a hugely valuable asset around
business process knowledge. Now, they have un-bundled it and market it as a very successful product-
based service business.
56 See http://www.deere.com/en US/golfturf/index.html for more information about John Deere One Source.
Observed December 4, 2010.
s7 All financial data in this paragraph, even for other years, is from IBM's 2009 Annual report.
What is special about IBM is that they are able to sell these product-based services even when it is
someone else's product. The information of a particular computing platform is relatively simply to pick
up and learn compared the knowledge of how business is done. They will implement their software on
someone else's hardware, or even implement someone else's software. IBM is actually divesting
themselves of their traditional products in favor of services, and growing while doing it.
2.6.3 - GE
I am aware of no company's annual report where services are featured so prominently in their strategy
as GE. As its 2009 annual report points out, over one-third of GE's revenue comes from product services
(their term) and - more significantly - nearly three-fourths of their industrial earnings comes from
services as well. Even more impressive than the $35B in product services revenue is the backlog of
$129B, which points to the stability of services as a revenue stream. GE also positions services -value-
and product-based - around their products and their customers:
e "Financing for the products we know with the people we know" (page 20)
* "Our competitive advantage in services is a deep understanding of our customers' productivity
based on how they use our products." (page 6)
That makes them in some ways the opposite of IBM in that regard; they use their services to - in a sense
- protect their products. That is the more common approach. While perhaps best-in-class, GE's service
emphasis is representative of companies in their sectors (IBM is not...most "computer" companies have
traditionally avoided services (Cusumano, 2010)). A number of providers of power systems, propulsion
systems, and air planes are the same in that regard. It has been observed that for at least some of those
companies, the end of the cold war forced them to get more creative in revenue sources (Spear, 2009).
I would argue that there are other factors that drive that business model as well:
* Nature and complexity of products creates a pre-disposition toward "systems thinking" and
taking a holistic approach to solve problems.
" Long product life and relatively few orders creates need to "do something" with expertise
between product sales.
* Specialized skills may be in short supply already and cannot be duplicated in separate service
and support organization (we'll discuss that idea more in the next section).
2.7 - Tying It Together: Generating Measurable Value from Knowledge
through Product-Based Services
To use the language and ideas of MIT Sloan Professors Eric Von Hippel and Tom Allen, knowledge
("how" questions and answers) and wisdom (forward-looking, or "why" questions and answers) are very
sticky, when compared to data and information58 . That is to say that since they are tough to reduce
completely to symbols and therefore encode onto paper or digital media, they tend not to travel very
s8 I defined the terms, "Data", "Information", "Knowledge", and "Wisdom" and described how they related to each
other and to services in Chapter 1.
far, very fast. They take very high-bandwidth environments to communicate well. Even today, that
often means people traveling in order to be face-to-face. What GE is doing with their product-based
services is breaking down traditional barriers on knowledge that cause it to be duplicated or perhaps
"over-built" when a separate service organization has to build similar competencies to deliver product-
based services, and in efficient markets, that's not tolerated forever (or even for long, in some cases). In
a traditional organization, we could portray it as in Figure 14. Within the walls of a traditional company
- where the "conceive", "design", and "implement" activities occur - boundaries tend to be more
porous and D-1-K-W flows more easily, making it generally more additive. Because of the greater
impedance, the operational knowledge around installing, maintaining, repairing, upgrading, etc. is much
more separated, and more differentiated.
Figure 14: D-l-K-W transmission in traditional organizations
Figure 15 shows a conceptualization of how that works in the GE model. The same repositories (or, in
practice, much closer to the same) are able to exist in all places because of the reduced impedance,
organizational and otherwise.
Figure 15: D-l-K-W transmission in a company like GE
As efficient markets force products seek the cost of capital, justifying that duplicated efforts to create
knowledge becomes tougher (impossible) to justify and therefore maintain. This "knowledge over-
build" of sorts will ultimately be eliminated in efficient markets. By making D-l-K-W flow more freely,
smart companies eliminate the over-build by making the same D-l-K-W available where it's needed.
Without that ability, it will be eliminated by a competitor simply re-producing a product's specifications
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without the knowledge and wisdom (which is not tolerated if it is not creating adequate value). That
can cause lesser products, but efficient, "invisible hand" markets don't know how to do anything else.
By tying the D-l-K-W stores from "conceive-design-implement" organization to the "operate"
organization(s), its value creation is not only clear, it is now a source of differentiation and services
revenue for a product company. We'll see later in Chapter 4 how the Rolls Royce Group takes that
notion a step further.
Chapter 3 - Information-Based Services
It is difficult (impossible?) to find an area of the modern economy un-impacted by the advanced of
information technology. This thesis will not (could not) attempt to address all of those areas. Very
specifically, I narrowed my gaze to product-service systems that require the automatic processing of
information because of either the speed of delivery or volume of data to process required. Within that
boundary, four potential areas to study came to mind:
e Online retail/e-tailing
e Social networking
* Ubiquitous computing/the Internet of Things
* Telematics.
I was particularly attracted to telematics in the automotive space. As with e-books and the long, static
history of media for reading, the relatively long and relatively static history of the automobile itself
provides an interesting backdrop to study any new trend 9 . Having the product itself less dynamic
means less noise which needs to be filtered in the study. Focusing on the telematics surrounding cars
and similar systems (like tractors and backhoes) also makes it possible to take a very different approach
to product-service systems than was taken in Chapter 2, focusing here on the product-service systems
themselves and working from the specific to the general.
3.1 - Defining Telematics
Like other ideas around information technology and information processing, the state of the art of
telemetrics is quickly advancing, and as with all modern IT systems, the costs of processing, storage, and
I/O are driven by Moore's law, and therefore declining while both the economy of scale is improving and
the associated scientific and engineering body of knowledge is improving. It seems that Moore's law is
treated to be almost as proven and established of a "law" as gravity.
Numerous definitions of telematics exist, and as with the definition of services itself, to find one that is
complete and satisfactory is a difficult endeavor. A definition of telematics may be a simple as "an
application of wireless networks in automobiles" (Grymek et al., 2007). In a more specific, more
complete fashion, the following definition can be used: "Vehicle telematics is the use of computing,
sensing and telecommunication technologies to provide services in an automotive environment"
(Cassias and Kun, 2007).
Also, as with the nature of services themselves, the enumerations of the types of potential telematics
products and services are as numerous and disparate as the definitions. In general, the length and
59 Construction equipment and agricultural equipment, where there are also lots of telematics services evolving
have been similarly static in their product evolution - incremental improvements to dominant designs for several
decades. The static nature of the auto industry has been well established by others and is presented as a given
here.
complexity of both definitions and service enumerations associated with telematics vary inversely with
their age. That is to be expected for any emerging field. Going to the vendors themselves, GM's 60
OnStar categorizes its services as follows:61
* Emergency & Security
* Vehicle Diagnostics
e Hands-Free Calling
e Turn-by-Turn Navigation
Ford's SYNC, Co-branded with Microsoft63, represents a different focus with their list of features:64
* Mobile
e Entertainment
e Traffic & Directions
e Driver Assistance
The Ford list represents a broader view of telematics, moving beyond the information-and-security focus
of OnStar to include "infotainment" features as well.
3.1.1 - A Simple Taxonomy
At the highest level, it seems that perhaps the goals of telematics systems
categories, as portrayed in Figure 16.
could be broken into five
Figure 16: Goals of Vehicle Telematics Systems
60 For more information about GM, please see Appendix A.
61 From http://www.onstar.com/web/portal/plansservices. Observed October 17, 2010.
62 For more information about Ford, please see Appendix A.
For more information about Microsoft, please see Appendix A.
64 See http://www.fordvehicles.com/technology/sync/features/#page=FeatureCategoryl. Observed October 17,
2010.
To be sure, the individual features available often do not fitly tightly into just one of those five
categories. For example, hands-free Bluetooth phone support, available with SYNC, OnStar, and many
other automotive telematics platforms has value for reasons of both "safety and security" and "ease of
use." Similarly, performance reports about the vehicle itself like those emailed by the OnStar system are
"system performance"-oriented, but information like tire pressure and scheduled maintenance
reminders have a strong "safety" element as well. Further, the centralized nature of the information
also qualifies for "ease of use." More commercially oriented telematics tools like Ford "Crew Chief"
(more later) or's JDLink (again, more later) are more focused on "productivity and ease of use" and
"system performance," and not much at all on entertainment.
It is worth noting that "informational" itself is a potential category, and is often used in other
descriptions of telematics systems, but I am aware of no telematics functions that are purely
informational; the information seems not an end unto itself. As an example, even something as simple
as providing basic information like the outside temperature has elements of both "safety and security"
and "ease of use." This attempt to organize is at odds with most telematics taxonomies, in that it is an
attempt to organize functions around high-level needs that are technology-independent; most systems
are organized around more actions which are thinly veiled descriptions of the technologies, like
"navigation" as a substitute for "GPS." In this taxonomy, those functions sit between the needs and
technologies used to implement them, with a hope that the needs would be more enduring and
technology-independent, and will facilitate broader comparisons across a wide definition of the
automotive industry, including heavy equipment like tractors and excavators.
Information can also be classified based on the knowledge domain from which it is derived. As is
mentioned in Chapter 1, Product Information comes from one of three primary information domains:
* The operator(s)
* The product
* The operating environment
Taken together, the two simple taxonomies of needs met and knowledge domain used, can be use to
organize features into a tabular arrangement as shown below in Table 6. That table can be used to
characterize the need and knowledge focus of the system and then compare them. Features are based
on those listed on the OEM's website, and the need and knowledge domain columns represent simple
yes/no answers, where "yes" is represented as a "1." The percentages represent the fraction of features
reflecting the need met or knowledge domain used. That makes it possible to total results for a system
to determine its focus. Since results are expressed in terms of percentages instead of absolute terms,
the granularity of the feature description does not matter.
Table 6: Characterizing the Needs Met and Knowledge Domains Used by GM OnStar and Ford SYNC
Knowledge
System Needs Met Domain Used
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Emergency Services 1 1 1 1
Crisis Assist 1 1 1 1
Stolen Vehicle Assistance 1 1 1
Remote Door Unlock 1 1 1
Roadside Assistance 1 1 1 1 1
Remote Horn & Lights 1 1
OnStar Vehicle Diagnostics 1 1 1 1
Hands-Free Calling 1 1 1 1
Turn-by-Turn Navigation 1 1 1
80% 10% 0% 30% 60% 30% 80% 60%
Ford SYNC Bluetooth phone support 1 1 1
Hands-Free Calling 1 1 1 1
Audible Text Messages 1 1 1 1
Uninterrupted Connections 1 1 1 1
Advanced Calling Features 1 1 1
Ringtone Support 11 1 1
Automatic Phonebook Download 1 1 1
Multiple e ngSupport 1 1 1
Media file format support 11
Music Search 1 1
USB Device Charging 1 1
"Play Similar" Feature 1 1
Podcast and Audiobook Support 1 1
Bluetooth Streaming Audio 1 1
Turn-by-Turn Directions 1 1 1
Traffic Alerts 1 1 11
Business Search 1 1 1
Personalized Daily Info 1 1
Travel Services 1 1
Send toSYNC 11
911 Assist 1 1 1 1
Vehicle Health Report 1 1 1 1 1
18% 5% 36% 36% 68% 86% 36% 27%
Since the purpose of the table is to represent the capabilities of the product-service system, different
packages (e.g. "Safe and Sounds" vs. "Directions and Connections" for GM OnStar) are not differentiated
here, although they could be for a more exhaustive treatment or a study of market positioning of
different offerings. It would also be possible to include other features like Ford "Crew Chief" (discussed
more later), but unless the OEM has chosen to classify them with the offering, they are not listed here.
Features like XM radio where it is primarily just the one-way reception and decoding of data, and DVD
systems where not remote connectivity is required, and sensor networks within the vehicle themselves,
are also not considered.
Summarizing the table results and placing them on a radar chart graphically portrays the emphases of
the different product-service systems. Figure 17 portrays the different focus in needs met. While ease
of use is a clear goal for both systems, the marketing value proposition of the respective systems is
clearly reflected in the features: Ford SYNC focuses on communication and entertainment, while GM
OnStar, beyond ease of use, is almost entirely focused on safety and security.
Comparing the Needs Met by GM OnStar and
Ford SYNC
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Figure 17: Comparing the Needs Met by GM OnStar and Ford SYNC
Using the same radar chart approach, Figure 18 shows the biases of the knowledge domains as well.
The limited integration of Ford SYNC into the automotive subsystems and its focus on the customer
experience are immediately evident. GM OnStar and its much deeper integration with the vehicle is
apparent as well.
Figure 18: Comparing the Knowledge Domains Used by GM OnStar and Ford SYNC
3.2 - A Tale of Two Systems: Ford SYNC and GM OnStar
A brief look at the On-Star and SYNC approaches to vehicular telematics also quickly reveals one other
major difference in approaches between the two companies: GM's OnStar is presented as a GM service,
marketed and developed by GM for GM cars6 5. Ford's SYNC is "Powered by Microsoft" and clearly
marketed and developed cooperatively.
As will be discussed more later in the thesis, this same dichotomy is quickly apparent in other related
industries featuring powered, mobile, complex electro-mechanical "car-like" systems as well.
Caterpillar6 6 and Case-New Holland67 ,68 are clearly aligned with Trimble 69 in their construction
(Caterpillar) and agricultural (Case-New Holland) telematics systems70 , while John Deere appears to have
gone it primarily alone with JDLink71 for construction equipment and JDLink 72/GreenStar 73 for
agricultural equipment.
65 More on this in a few pages.
66 For more information about Caterpillar, please see Appendix A.
67 For more information about Case-New Holland, please see Appendix A.
68 See http://www.putvourfarmonthemap.com/. Observed October 17, 2010.
69 For more information about Trimble, please see Appendix A.
70 See http://www.trimble.com/news/release.aspx?id=091001a. Observed October 17, 2010.
71 See http://www.deere.com/en US/cfd/construction/deere const/service support/idlink.htmi. Observed
October 18, 2010.
72 See
http://www.deere.com/servlet/com.deere.u90785.productcatalog.view.servlets.ProdCatProduct?tM=FR&pNbr=jdI
select. Observed October 18, 2010.
73 See http://www.deere.com/en US/ProductCatalog/FR/categorV/FR GREENSTAR.html. Observed October 18,
2010.
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3.2.1 - A Brief History of GM's OnStar
OnStar's history is very well documented. OnStar grew out of an IBM Extreme Blue74 internship as a
vehicle location system in the mid-1990s (Held, 2008). From there, the idea grew into a joint venture
between GM, Hughes Electronics, and EDS: Project Beacon (Holstein, 2009). The layer of the World
Wide Web over the previously academic Internet was proving that information could become ubiquitous
and that anything could be made available to drivers; to do so was very tempting to the OnStar team -
traffic reports, stock prices, any information could be presented. Early on, OnStar leader Chet Huber
and his team made some basic choices that still influence/govern OnStar today: minimal distractions to
drivers - hence the simple, three-button interface usually integrated into the rearview mirror - and a
focus on safety and security.
GM created OnStar as a separate division initially with a view towards selling OnStar on non-GM cars as
well, which they did with some success early on. Lexus's "Link" (started in 2000 and discontinued in
2008 just before Toyota released their own, limited, very similar service) was a re-branded OnStar
offering (Webb et al., 2010). Acura, Isuzu, Audi, and Subaru cars also offered OnStar (Bowens, 2005) but
all have stopped. The interface standard that GM created, AMI-C75, never really caught on either.
Ultimately - in a situation that feels similar to PepsiCo and their fast food subsidiaries before they were
spun off that pushed fast-food beverage business to Coca-Cola - the automotive companies felt that the
close tie to GM was a detriment to their businesses. In its 2007 Annual Report, GM themselves began to
recognize OnStar as "a competitive advantage" which strongly implies that - despite early attempts to
position it as such - they recognize that it is not OEM-neutral. It is a part of GM.
The re-born GM finds itself again in the situation of selling the service on non-GM brands simply because
of the state of brands like Saturn and Hummer. The future for those- brands is not clear and the decision
is in the hands of the new management (Huber and Dorfstatter, 2009). GM is also interested in again
developing arrangements for brands that have never been in the GM family and is hinting that it will
happen (Huber and Dorfstatter, 2009) in the next couple of years.
The most significant decision76 GM made was not around architecture or features, but how to position
and sell it: product or service. In the mid-1990s, services for cars meant either ways that the dealers
made money or ways that GMAC77 made money - not GM itself. The most natural and safest choice
would have been to position it as a feature or a product. Considering that the telematics industry really
did not yet exist, it would not be too strong to describe that decision to position it as a service offering
as visionary.
7 See http://www-01.ibm.com/employment/us/extremeblue/. Observed October 23, 2010.
75AMI-C: "Automotive Multimedia Interface Collaboration" or "Automotive Multimedia Interface Consortium."
Website http://www.ami-c.org is no longer available. At one point, the Detroit three and others belonged, but it
appears to have been abandoned. Microsoft is proposing a competing standard for their embedded auto
architecture.
7 What Barabba et al call the "fundamental decisions." Source: Barabba V., Huber C., Cooke F., Pudar N., Smith J.,
Paich M. (2002) A multimethod approach for creating new business models: The General Motors OnStar project.
Interfaces 32:20.
77 GMAC - General Motors Acceptance Corporation - was the finance division of GM.
3.2.2 - Is OnStar Profitable?
On several occasions over the last several years, GM has claimed OnStar to be profitable, but it is
difficult to know. Their annual report does not break out financial performance for OnStar separately,
and it is not clear from publically available documents whether OnStar internally recognizes revenue
from the car divisions for that first year of subscription that comes with the vehicle purchase price or
not. Looking across a variety of articles, you can start to construct some snapshots of different statistics
in different years. Table 7 shows spotty statistics culled from a number of sources (those footnoted
here). Table 8 represents an attempt to do that, and Table 9 tries to infer all of those values for 2010,
making a number of assumptions. See Moore's Law in action in Table 7 as the hardware price cuts in
half every two years and goes from $800 to $100 in a six-year period.
Table 7: Spotty OnStar Statistics
call cars Sold
Total center Other HW with Ad IT Renewal
Year Subscribers Revenue Employees Operators contractors cost OnStar Spending Budget Rate
1996 $800
1999 200,000
2002 2,000,000 400 1,000 $100
2006 60%
2008 $ 95M
2010 6,000,000 $1B 500 2,500,000 $ 250M
Table 8: Inferring Some 2010 Statistics for OnStar
Subscribers 6,000,000
Revenue $1,000,000,000
Employees 800 (est.)
Contractors 3,500 (est.)
HW Cost/car $50 (est.)
Cars Sold 2,500,000
Ad Spending $50,000,000
IT Spending $250,000,000
Renewal Rate 60%
Table 9 could be a breakdown of major expenses and potential profitability78 . While most of these
numbers are estimates, as a simple sanity check, OnStar could easily be making money for GM, and a
very nice margin at that, well exceeding anyone's cost of capital or hurdle rate in their manufacturing
operations, and a profit of 30% certainly exceeds their margins on automotive or automotive credit
operations even in very good years.
78 Assuming an average cost of $40,000/contractor and $80,000 per employee.
Table 9: Potential 2010 Profitability for OnStar
Estimated Revenue $ 1,000,000,000
Non-IT Employees $ (53,600,000)
Non-IT Contractors $ (120,000,000)
Other Admin $ (100,000,000)
Advertising $ (50,000,000)
IT Costs $ (250,000,000)
HW Cost for new cars $ (125,000,000)
Estimated Income $ 301,400,000
What if OnStar were able to offer its services to all passenger cars on the road? According the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics, the total passenger car market in the United States is over 137M vehicles79.
Assuming the same 60% renewal rate and the same level of profitability per car, OnStar's gross revenue
could be over $13B/year with potential income of over $4B/year. Based on the same BTS data,
expanding beyond passenger cars to all vehicles almost doubles the market size.
3.2.3 - A Brief History of Ford's SYNC
SYNC is not Ford's first foray into the telematics space. OnStar was actually a fast-follower to RESCU
(Remote Emergency Satellite Cellular Unit), a joint effort between Motorola and Ford for the 1997
Lincoln Continental. It offered Automatic Collision Notification (ACN) and (analog) cellular phone
service. RESCU was discontinued in 2001 (Webb, 2010). WingCast, developed with QUALCOMM 80 , was
its next attempt, but as Ford switched from the Jacques Nassir era to the William Clay Ford Jr. era, the
plug got pulled on it before it went live (Unknown, 2002).
Ford was silent in the telematics space for the next few years until Ford SYNC was released in 2008.
Ford and Microsoft8 ' developed the platform together, based on the Microsoft Auto platform, giving
Ford exclusivity until 2009. Kia will soon be releasing UVO and Fiat has released Blue & Me - both based
on Microsoft Auto as well8 2.
Just as OnStar is focused primarily on safety and security, SYNC is focused primarily on Infotainment.
There are other major differences as well. SYNC is a $395 product feature, instead of a service 3
Additionally, SYNC does not include native mobile telephony. Instead, it interfaces with the drivers'
79 See http://www.bts.gov/publications/national transportation statistics/html/table 01 11.html. Observed
October 22, 2010.
80 For more information about QUALCOMM, please see Appendix A.
8 It is assumed that the reader is familiar with Microsoft. For more information, please see
http://www.microsoft.com/about/en/us/default.aspx. For a more neutral, but potentially less rigorous summary
of the firm, please see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft. Both observed October 21, 2010.
82 See http://www.microsoft.com/windowsembedded/en-us/products/windows-embedded-
automotive/default.mspx for more information. Observed October 19, 2010
83 After three years, some SYNC functionality requires a $60/year subscription, so while primarily positioned as a
product, there is a small service element as well, from a financial perspective.
mobile phone. The primary differences between Ford SYNC and GM OnStar are summarized below in
Table 10.
Table 10: Summary Comparison of GM OnStar and Ford SYNC
Aspect/Telematics GM OnStar Ford SYNC
System
Needs-Met Focus Safety and Security Infotainment
Knowledge Domain Product Operator
Focus
Mobile Telephony Native Provided by consumer
(Network
Architecture)
Business Model Subscription-based Product Feature
Service
Product Positioning Competitive Co-branded ("Powered by Microsoft"). At arm's
Advantage for GM length from company's core product.
3.2.4 - Ford's Related Offerings
Ford also has several other related offerings focused on productivity for construction sites in pick-up
trucks that were also released in 2008 and based on the Microsoft Auto platform, but not as well
marketed as SYNC 84 . They have since been expanded to Ford E-Series and Transit vans.
* In-Dash Computer (developed with Microsoft using a wireless keyboard, optional mobile printer
and an in-dash computer to access office files, remotely control a PC, or do other basic functions
from the field.)
e Tool-Link (in partnership with DeWalt and ThingMagic85'8 using UHF passive RFID tags and
readers to track tools).
* Crew Chief (GPS-based Fleet optimization and management).
While not branded as a part of SYNC, there are shared architectural components, and show another
difference between the approaches of GM and Ford, with Ford branching out into productivity
applications, and starting to treat telematics as a platform. As with SYNC, these are positioned as
84 For more information, see http://www.FordWorkSolutions.com. Observed October 19, 2010.
as While DeWalt is mentioned on the Ford page, ThingMagic is not, likely because it is not a brand familiar to the
typical Ford audience. See ThingMagic's announcement here: http://www.thingmagic.com/applications-
overview/toollink-by-dewalt. Observed October 21, 2010.
During the writing of this Thesis, ThingMagic got acquired by Trimble, a company about which we will read more
later in this chapter. Since - at this point - it does not materially change anything, there is not a need to address it
further.
product features. The network connectivity - while not assumed to be provided by the customer as
with SYNC - is contracted separately with Sprint.
3.2.5 - Total Sales
In its three model years in the market place, SYNC has already topped 2M in sales and Ford reports that
it is now sold in 70% of new cars. It is too early to assess whether SYNC is profitable or to compare the
approaches of SYNC and OnStar as business models, but Ford CEO Alan Mulally has been quoted as
saying that "these features set us apart."' As a concrete measure of that assertion, Ford's product
development chief Derrick Kuzak and CEO Mulally have both been variously quoted as saying that the
infotainment system was crucial to 32% of buyers in 2009.
3.2.6 - Why Such Different Approaches?
It is not possible to definitely answer the question of why Ford and GM have such different approaches,
but there are some observations that can be made.
3.2.6.1 - Different Architectures
Architecturally, what the two companies are doing is similar, but there are some important differences
that are reflected in their strategies. Kevin Baughey's 2007 MIT thesis presents ostensibly the OnStar
(based on the AMI-C "standard") architecture and a commercial OS architecture (as with Microsoft's
embedded Auto OS) as containing the same elements with different interfaces and layering. Figure 19
portrays that where the Standards-Based Architecture, which represents AMI-C/OnStar and the more
integrated than the commercial OS, which represents SYNC (Baughey, 2007).
t1; VI MWY I
I--------------------------------
&W4* - - ~- -- -- --
JI
Figure 19: Comparing a Standards-based and Commercial OS Telematics Architecture (Baughey, 2007)
It seems unlikely that a single architecture will emerge at this point as AMI-C is already waning in
support. In 1999 Ford was among the automotive manufacturers that supported it (Lappin, 1999). In
fact, in 1999 manufacturers representing more than half the cars on the road were behind AMI-C, but
once support for a standard fractures, it is hard for them to re-gain traction, and the market is now
87 At the 2010 Las Vegas Consumer Electronics Show in his keynote speech.
mature enough that existing companies are trying to protect their territories, and they are unlikely to
"give away" ground. As with CDMA and G3 mobile phone networks, unified standards that work across
entire industries are seldom put back together once companies start making real money and
competitive barriers are believed to be required. Consider - as two examples of successful standards
work unifying an industry - the work of MIT Professor Sanjay Sarma and MIT's Auto-ID Lab to lead the
development standards for UHF passive RFID before the industry became highly profitable, or the
development of standards like DNS and TCP/IP that drive the Internet and the World Wide Web and
were created long before Netscape's IPO.
3.2.6.2 - Different Times
The first factor to consider in explaining the different approaches is the time difference of the birth of
these ideas. Ford's RESCU - conceived in the same time period - was very similar to OnStar at the time.
In the mid-1990s, more robust offerings were not possible. SYNC, conceived in a much different era
knew that more could be done. The biggest competitor for the original OnStar and RESCU was a 1996
cell phone, which - in today's mobile phone terms - did not do much.
Ten years later, the systems competed with a much richer ecosystem of personal devices, each of which
could provide some of the potential services that an automotive telematics platform can provide. In
2006, as Ford SYNC was being conceived and developed, the competitors for automotive telematics
could be thought of as portrayed in Figure 20. Figure 20 also portrays the fact that smart phone was
competing with the same collection of devices. That is still true, but the smart phone is winning.
Between 2006 and 2010, the smart phone has begun to eliminate the categories of personal music
systems, and personal navigation systems. For example, the category of personal digital assistants has
been completely consumed, and smart phones are the primary web browser for many younger
Americans, and perhaps the only web browser for many in some emerging economies.
Figure 20: The 2006 competitive andscape for Automotive Telematics Systems, for Smart phones
Ten years earlier, the same idea held true, OnStar and RESCU competed with the state of the art in
mobile phones, which wasn't much. Said differently, the metaphor for SYNC is a smart phone. The
metaphor or OnStar is (for lack of a better term) a "dumb" mobile phone. That is not to say that the
OnStar architecture or value proposition is outdated. With a renewal rate reported at 60%, it is clear
that the simple and straightforward "safety-and-security" message resonates with customers, and the
simplicity and maturity of the components likely make it very cost-effective to implement.
The different times are also reflected in the different development models. The relatively financially
healthy GM of the mid-1990s (compared to the last few years) was able to marshal the capital required
largely to "go it alone" while the Ford of 2006 was already "chips all in" on their own future" and
needed partners not just to move quickly, but to keep the capital requirements outside of the company.
SYNC was also developed in a world where the notions of open innovation exhibited there are much
more broadly accepted and understood than they were a decade earlier.
What is toughest to explain from the externally observable evidence, and what is most salient to this
thesis, is why OnStar is positioned more as a service and SYNC more as a product feature. Two potential
explanations are evident. The first most obvious suggestion is that Ford - as an automotive
manufacture - is a product company and thinks in product terms. That is consistent with the way they
have positioned SYNC, "Crew Chief", the snazzily named In-Dash Computer, and Tool-Link. In all cases,
the most obvious servitizable element - the connectivity - is either customer-provided (as with SYNC) or
sold by a third-party. Even with presented with obvious opportunities for subscription-based service
revenue, they have avoided or minimized it. One can only assume that they see that as outside of their
core value proposition and/or perhaps somehow a threat to their dealer network.
The second potential explanation, which is related to the "chips all in" comment earlier in the thesis, is
that the immediate benefit of a sellable product feature was more attractive when compared to the
slower benefit of the service. With SYNC now chosen as an option in 70% of sales and the infotainment
option crucial to 32% of buyers, it is impacting sales and increasing market share today. For the only of
the Detroit Three that did not receive government aid, it was already feeling the urgency for a more
immediate return in 2006 through 2008 as SYNC was being designed and rolled out.
A more complete explanation would include both of those factors and also recognize that Ford can still
develop or acquire OnStar-like capabilities and add them to the existing platform. Doing so still gives
them the benefit of all of the "buzz" around SYNC while still eliminating the competitive advantage that
GM presently enjoys in the area of safety and security. The converse is true as well; GM can add more
infotainment features over time. The challenge for Ford, though, is that a deep level of integration like
GM now has takes years to develop, and can impact and be impacted by very slowly evolving
components like data buses.
8 In late 2006, Ford borrowed $23B for restructuring. Please see http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-
01/ford-debt-payment-means-dividend-possible-in-2012-a-year-before-forecast.html for more information.
Observed October 20, 2010.
3.2.7 - How Do We Interpret the Industry?
As was mentioned above, it seems possible, if not likely, that OnStar and SYNC will continue to converge
in features. If GM takes on the infotainment side of the equation more directly and more fully, it will
likely do so with partners as well, for many of the reasons that drove Ford to do so (scare capital, tight
development cycles, uncertain future).
To be clear, it is not that GM vehicles are without infotainment options, like XM radio89 . They are just
delivered outside of their telematics platform, and they lag behind newer offerings like Internet radio,
Twitter integration and iTunes integration as with Ford SYNC. Similarly, Ford SYNC does support "911
Assist" but it does it using the driver's cell phone, which must be present, charged, and connected, as
opposed to OnStar that has its own cellular connection built in.
While they do so with varying emphases, it seems that both of the telematics offerings reviewed here,
whether implemented as product features or services, whether they are sold from the automotive
OEMs or partner companies, whether they are one-time charges, or subscription-based, are converging
on a similar set of features. As discussed above, those features all center on the same customer needs:
* Ease of use
* Safety and security
" System Performance
e Productivity
" Entertainment
That does not mean, however, that the systems all support the same features packaged in the same
manner. If that were true, then we would be beginning to enter the era of what MIT Sloan Professor Jim
Utterback would call the dominant design (Utterback, 1994). In his seminal book, "Mastering the
Dynamics of Innovation", Professor Utterback discusses the trajectory of products and industries.
Professor Utterback asserts - and supports with extensive examples from his research - that you can
measure the maturity and life cycle of a product and its industry by watching the flow and allocation of
resources as indicators of value migration, whether those resources are financial capital or intellectual
capital.
There are some minor caveats that must be given regarding the applicability of that body of knowledge
to this situation, however. First, the major players in this field are primarily the automotive OEMs and
their tier-one suppliers. That makes it much more difficult to measure the flow of financial resources
into the industry. Secondly, the applicability of Professor Utterback's work to services, or product-
service systems with strong service elements, is not yet well-established, but that concern is of limited
value since the academic papers and patents that can be searched are focused on the product - not
service - side of the product-service-system.
While we cannot watch the flow of capital assets easily into divisions like GM's OnStar or Microsoft's
Auto embedded system, it is possible to watch other signals like patents and academic papers. Figure
89 See http://www.gm.com/vehicles/services/xmradio/. Observed October 20, 2010.
21 portrays the number of scientific and academic papers done in the area of vehicle telematics since
1983, the first year of recorded activity90 . While 2008 seems to have been the peak, macro-economic
factors would strongly influence this field, so it is not possible to know whether we are truly declining or
not.
Number of Scientific Articles About
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Figure 21: Scientific and Academic Publications about Vehicle Telematics, by Year
In other cases, patents could also be reviewed to evaluate the commercialization of technology, but
academic and scientific work always leads patent activity, so it would not provide any further clarity.
Patent searches are also as much art as science and can be inexact to begin with. Reviewing the number
of firms in a given industry can also give an indication of resource and value migration, but there is no
appropriate NCAIS code to track vehicle telematics and much of the work is being done by existing firms.
Referring to Professor Utterback's research again, it is also tough to recognize where vehicle telematics
represents the evolution of an existing, mature field (automobiles) migrating its value - and therefore
resources - to services, or whether it represents a new industry. Figure 22 (Utterback, 2010) shows that
there are three value migration points in an industry lifecycle. The first value migration is at the birth of
an industry. More and more firms and more and more resources enter a field until a dominant design is
reached. Until then, the nature of competition is based on building the best product. After that point,
the competition is centered on building essentially the same product in the most effective manner. That
is represented by the shift in focus from product to process. There is another shift of value (and,
therefore resources) as it becomes no longer possible for firms to distinguish themselves based on
90 Compiled using IsI Web of Knowledge with the following search: Topic=(automotive OR vehicle telematics).
process. At that point, services become the basis of competition. It could be that telematics are just like
vehicle financing and represent the servitization of a mature industry where all product differentiation
and process efficiency has been wrung out. The strong role of the OEMs, the maturity of the industry,
and the OnStar business model would support that view.
It could also be that the vehicle telematics industry is not really best viewed as a part of the auto
industry, but instead as a part of the consumer electronics/personal communication industry, and that
we are better suited to view the industry as a parallel to the smart phone. Ford's business model and
the prominence of tech companies like Microsoft would support that view. It is simply too early to
know, but the best answer, to quote Forrest Gump, is most likely "It's both."
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Figure 22: Dominant Design and the Migration of Resources
3.28 - GM OnStar & Ford SYNC -- Some Observations and Conclusions
Part of what is so appealing about GM and Ford's offerings as opportunities for study, as with Redbox,
Netflix, and Blockbuster in the previous chapter, is their different business models to deliver similar
product-service systems to customers. Here, the firms also have very similar histories, scale, and
structures, and are a part of a large, mature, global, and exceptionally well documented industry. "GM
vs. Ford" is about as close to controlled lab experiments as the real world of business is going to give us.
What have we learned that can be generalized?
* Product-Service Systems can have different emphases on the product and service components,
depending on the wants, needs, and capabilities of the stakeholders involved. Ford has chosen
a product feature-based approach, which seems to act as a catalyst for vehicle sales, which
provides short-term cash. GM has focused on the subscription-based service approach which
provides a long-term, stable stream of fees. The choices can be understood when placed in the
context of the eras in which each firm made those choices.
* While it is too early to tell with SYNC, there is strong evidence that OnStar has a very profitable
business model. GM could consider making OnStar a separate company, which would increase
the likelihood of expanding the service to non-GM cars.
e Ford seems almost to be avoiding the services element of the product-service systems they are
deploying, despite an apparent willingness for customers to consume services from automobile
providers.
e The approach of GM's OnStar and Ford's SYNC are largely complementary to each other. Ford
has developed a good model for how to interact with smart phone and personal music systems
by co-developing and moving quickly. GM has found a way to position safety & security features
using a native cellular connection in a way that requires deeper vehicle integration but provides
a value proposition more clearly separate from that of a mobile phone. It seems likely that the
products will continue to converge, moving toward an obvious dominant design in the next few
years. At that point, the industry will move from a war on features to a war on process and
therefore price. At that point, it will also become more obvious whether to view this as a part of
the automotive industry or a part of personal communication.
* Just as integration and/or adaptation of the paradigm of the mobile phone and its services is
applicable to a wide list of transportation platforms, can it be applied to other product-centric
systems? Part of what makes the United States such a strong market for telematics - beyond
our collective love affair with cars - is how much time we spend in them. What opportunities
for telematics services exist in other places where we spend time? Most obviously, what about
homes?
e According to Professor Utterback's work on innovation and value migration, if this the next era
for the automotive industry, then GM's approach to OnStar is more consistent with where value
capture is occurring. As the product focus and process focus phases have ended, what are left
behind are mature, efficient markets where products are valued simply at the cost of capital. If
that is the case, the Ford may be giving away more of their future than they should with their
present approach.
Based on what can be observed about GM and Ford, can those same patterns be observed in similar
industries? We found that Ford and GM differed on six major aspects:
e Focus of Needs Met (safety and security, ease of use, entertainment, communication, system
performance)
e Focus of Knowledge Domains Used (operator, product, operating environment)
e Telephony - or more broadly, network - architecture (native vs. customer-provided)
e Go-to-market strategy (early offering, consistent message vs. false starts and later arrival)
e Business Model (Product feature vs. Subscription Service)
e Brand Positioning (competitive advantage for OEM vs. co-branded, co-developed, and at arm's
length)
Of those, for our purposes, the last two are the most important.
To answer that question, the paper will now turn to the construction equipment industry and look at
telematics there. As with the automotive sector, there are two obvious firms to compare, each with
telematics product-service systems in the marketplace. As with automotive, they are not the only two,
but they are the best candidates for comparison: Caterpillar (Cat) and Deere & Company (John Deere, or
Deere).
3.3 - Construction Equipment Telematics
3.3.1 - About the United States Construction Equipment Industry
The United States construction market which these equipment sales support peaked in 200691. As
indicated in Figure 23, 2009 spending of $935.6B is down 19.9% from 2006 levels. As is evident in the
chart, the biggest driver of that change is the decline in residential construction spending. The decline
would have been much larger without increases in public spending in the years since the peak. It seems
that the housing industry has finally stabilized, and 2010 may indicate the beginning of a recovery.
Figure 23: US Construction Spending by year and sector. Source: Standard & Poor's
91 Source for this paragraph: Standard & Poor's Industry Survey: Heavy Equipment & Trucks - June 17, 2010
The total market for US construction equipment for 2010 is estimated to be $33B9 2 . Besides Caterpillar
(33% of market) and John Deere (8%), other players in the US construction equipment market are:
" Terex (6.4%)
e Case-New Holland (6.1%)
e Komatsu (5.4%)
3.3.1 - About Caterpillar & Trimble
In September of 2001, after working together for six years already, Caterpillar and Trimble announced 93
a 50/50 joint venture research & development company, Caterpillar Trimble Control Technologies, LLC
(CTCT) to develop position-based products for the construction and mining industries. CTCT is based in
Dayton, Ohio. In October, 2008 they also formed a 65/35 (Trimble/Cat) second joint venture called
VirtualSite Solutions that is based in Westminster, CO - home of Trimble's Engineering & Construction
product development and marketing organization 4 . Caterpillar & Trimble's relationship started roughly
the same time that GM began pursuing OnStar.
3.3.3 - Caterpillar's Telematics
The role of telematics in construction equipment is more than novel, entertaining, and convenient as it
is in world of passenger cars. Efficiency in this segment, whether from labor savings, fuel savings, or
more efficient use of capital assets, is converted directly into dollars, and since so much of construction
work goes to the lowest bidder, there is a strong financial incentive to be more efficient than the
competition.
Product Link9 5 is the heart of Caterpillar's Fleet Management Solutions96 . It provides both location
services and networked connectivity to the products. It delivers GPS-based location with
communication over LEO satellites or (not both) GSM cell networks in order to provide a wide variety of
location- and product-based information to the fleet manager. The types of information it provides are
broken into three different offerings: Asset Watch, Maintenance Watch, and Health Watch. Asset
Watch is subset of Maintenance Watch and Health Watch. Product Link was developed by Trimble and
available on competitive equipment as well. The web-based Client, VisionLink, is also developed by
Trimble. Hardware is standard equipment on new Caterpillar equipment, can be retro-fitted on older
equipment, and is available from Trimble for competitive equipment with more limited integration. It is
sold as a subscription-based service.
92 According to IBISWorld Industry Report 33312 - Construction Machinery Manufacturing in the US, September
2010, by Steven Connell
9 See http://www.ctct.com/news/release.aspx?id=091001a. Observed October 21, 2010.
94 See http://www.trimble.com/about history.shtml. Observed October 21, 2010.
95 See http://www.cat.com/PL. Observed October 22, 2010.
96 See http://www.cat.com/technology/fleet-management-solutions. Observed October 22, 2010.
3.3.4 - John Deere's Telematics
JDLink97 is John Deere's telematics platform. As with Caterpillar's Product Link, there are levels of
service as well: Express, Select, and Ultimate- where each is a superset of the previous. JDLink is now
standard equipment on practically all of John Deere's construction equipment. JDLink is also available
for to be placed on competitive equipment (JDLink Express only for all-makes). JDLink was developed
with QUALCOMM 98 and supports cellular connectivity. QUALCOMM provided not just development
expertise but hosting expertise as well99. Deere construction equipment comes with a complimentary
subscription for JDLink Ultimate for one year. While the marketing message is more strongly John Deere
than the Cat-Trimble message, QUALCOMM appears to have had a strong roll in development as well as
the on-going support of the system. JDLink is also the telematics platform for John Deere's agricultural
equipment.
Fleet Care'00 works with JDLink, and Preventative Maintenance Schedule and vehicle fluid analysis to
generate proactive machine health information. The service is sold and administered by the Dealer. As
discussed in Chapter 2, it is worth noting that does own part of its construction dealer network.
Caterpillar does not appear to own any of its dealerships.
3.3.5 - Comparing the Approaches of Caterpillar and John Deere
Using the same method for comparing the telematics offerings between Caterpillar and JDLink as was
used between GM OnStar and Ford SYNC, as is shown in Table 11, Table 12, Figure 24 and Figure 25, we
find that the needs focus and knowledge domains used are very consistent with each other. Unlike GM
OnStar and Ford SYNC, their coverage on the radar charts is nearly identical. Equally as striking as their
similarity with each other is their difference from the consumer telematics products featured in Figure
17. While - collectively - the consumer systems are very oriented on the user/operator information
domain and their safety, communication, and entertainment needs, the (commercial) construction
telematics systems are focused almost entirely on product information productivity (manifested in
system performance and ease of use). As before, percentages in the table represent the fraction of
features meeting the need or using the knowledge domain.
97 See http://www.deere.com/en US/cfd/construction/deere const/products/idlink nextgen.html. Observed
October 22, 2010.
98 See http://www.deere.com/en US/cfd/construction/deere const/newsroom/071219 idlink.html. Observed
October 22, 2010.
99 From John Deere-produced "JDLink Overview" video available at http://www.plasterer.com/. Observed October
22, 2010.
100 See http://nortrax.com/service/fleet-care/index.html. Observed October 22, 2010.
Table 11: Caterpillar Product Link Product Attributes
Knowledge
_____ System NeedMet Domain Used
(A (A m r) m 0 003 < 0 W
S 3 o
0 f.u
3 CD
04 0C CD 3OEM -S-S Feaure ___ _____________W
Machine Location 1 1 1 1
Machine Location Mapping 1 1 1 1
Machine Location History 1 1 1 1
Non-reporting Machine Identification 1 1 1 1 1
Machine Hour Reading 1 1 1 1
Machine Hour History 1 1 1 1
Time and Geo-Fencing 1 1 1
Time and Geo-Fencing Alerts 1 1 1
Asset Watch Distribution % 100 100
Planned Maintenance History 1 1 1
Planned Maintenance (PM) Notes 1 1 1
Next PM Due 1 1 1
PM Alerts 1 1 1
PM Checklist 1 1 1
PM Parts List 1 1 1
Customized PM Checklist 1 1 1
PM and Repair Planner 1 1 1
On-line Parts Ordering 1 1 1
Manage Major Repairs 1 1 1
Repair History 1 1 1
PM or Repair Request for Quote 1 1 1
Maintenance Watch Distribution % 100 0 100 100
PL Event and Diagnostic Codes 1 1 1
Health Event and Diagnostic Troubleshooting 1 1 1
Watch Event and Diagnostic Code Alerts 1 1 1 1
Event and Diagnostic Code History 1 1 1
Fuel Level 1 1 1
Fuel Used 1 1 1
Fuel Used History & Graphic Display 1 1 1
Refueling History 1 1 1
Health Watch Distribution 13 100 0 0 100 0 100 0
Totals Product Link Totals % 14 
93 0 I 100
Cat PL
Asset
Watch
PL
Maint.
Watch
SProduct Link Totals % 14 93 0 1100Totals
Table 12: John Deere JDLink Product Attributes
Knowledge
System Need Met Domain Used
0
-
(D ~
(D 3 0 Cr'
(D 3' m
OEM P-S-S Feature .- g 3 9 g 3
John DLink Machine Hours (daily reports) 1 1 1
Deere Exp. Geofence (daily reports) 1 1 1 1
Location (daily reports) 1 1 1 1
Curfew (daily reports) 1 1 1 1
Maintenance (daily reports) __ 1 1 1
JDLink Express Distribution % 0 100 0 0 100 0 100 60
JDLink Machine Hours (real-time) 1 __ 1 1
Select Geofence (real-time) 1 ____ 1 1 1
Location (real-time) 1 1 1 1
Curfew (real-time) 1 1 1 1
Maintenance alerts (real-time) 1 1 1
Additional Sensors 1 __1 1
Equipment Utilization 1 __1 1 1
Work-vs-Idle 1 __ 1 1 1
_______JDLink Select Distribution % 0 100 0 0 100 25 100 38
JDLink Machine Hours (real-time) 1 __1 1
Ult- Geofence (real-time) 1 __1 1 1
Location (real-time) 1 1 1 1
Curfew (real-time) 1 1 1 1
Maintenance alerts (real-time) 1 1 1
Additional Sensors 1 __1 1
Equipment Utilization 1 1 1 1
Work-vs-Idle 1 1 1 1
Dashboard Alerts 1 1 1 __
Diagnostic Codes 1 1 1
SJDLink Ultimate Distribution = Total % 0 100 0 0 100 20 100 30
Figure 24: Comparing the Needs Met by Caterpillar Product Link and John Deere JDLink
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Figure 25: Comparing the Knowledge Domains Used by Caterpillar Product Link and John Deere JDLink
Using the same five attributes discussed between GM OnStar and Ford SYNC, we can compare in
Caterpillar Product Link and John Deere JDLink in the following way in Table 13:
Comparing the Needs Met by Cat Product
Link and John Deere JDLink
Safety &
Security
Ease of Us System - - Cat Product Link Total
erformance
-U--John Deere JDLink
Ultimate
Communication - Entertainment
Table 13: Comparing Caterpillar Product Link and John Deere JDLinkBusiness Model
Aspect/Telematics System Caterpillar Product Link John Deere JDLink
Needs-Met Focus Productivity: Ease of Use and Productivity: Ease of Use and System
System Performance Performance
Knowledge Domain Focus Product Product
Network Architecture Cellular and Satellite01  Cellular
Business Model Subscription-based service Subscription-based service
Product Positioning JDLink by John Deere Product Link by Caterpillar and
Trimble
3.3.6 - Some Observations about Caterpillar Product Link and John Deere
JDLink
The features between these systems are almost identical. These are both industrial fleet management
solutions marketed as services with initial subscriptions bundled in the purchase price. The only major
difference is where the development has been done in their respective capability chains. Deere, while
leaning on QUALCOMM some, has developed their platform. I would characterize the capability as
more integrated than Ford and less integrated than GM. Caterpillar, on the other hand, has kept
telematics at arm's length from its core capabilities and products. Figure 26 says the same thing
graphically. In the short-term, that may be an advantage for Caterpillar, but in the long-term, it seems
that it could be a major liability. That idea will be explored more, later in the chapter.
Figure 26: Positioning Telematics in a Company's Capability Chain for Passenger Cars and Construction
101 Considering that Cat equipment works on a larger scale and in more remote locations, the difference in
telematics architectures is not surprising. John Deere's construction equipment is not large enough to often be in
environments without cellular coverage.
102 Various promotional videos on Deere dealer websites allude to QUALCOMM's involvement.
Now, let's briefly review agricultural equipment telematics.
3.4 - Agricultural Equipment Telematics
3.4.1 - The United States Agricultural Industry
Although not as big as the construction industry, the farm industry in the United States is big business.
As is shown in Table 14, the harvesting of corn, soybeans, wheat, and grains will be generate $90B in
103revenue this yeari . Corn is the biggest driver, with anticipated revenue that accounts for over half of
that number.
Table 14: Estimated 2010 US Crop Revenues
2010 2010 10-14
Revenue Profits 05-09 Growth
Commodity (est.) (est.) Growth (est.)
Corn $50.8B $10.0B 15.40% 3.80%
Soybeans $31.3B $3.2B 10.10% -2%
Wheat $13.1B - 7.40% 0.40%
Grains $2.6B $0.22B 5.50% 0.50%
Figure 27 shows the growth that the corn industry has seen over the last decade 10 4. Growth is driven by
a number of factors, two of which are increased uses for corn, including ethanol production, and global
pressures for more and better food. The rising standard of living puts extreme pressures on crops that
can be used as feed sources, because 70% to 90% or more of the energy in the crop is lost in conversion
to meat, milk, or egg protein (Manoulian et al., 2008). Said differently, it can take up to ten calories of
corn or grain to produce one calorie of meat, so incrementally more people eating (or wanting to eat)
meat puts much more than incremental pressure on grain production.
103 Source: IBISWorld Industry Reports: July - September 2010
"4 Source: IBISWorld Industry Report: Corn - September 2010
Figure 27: US Corn Revenue, 1998-2009
To meet those kinds of demands, Figure 28 shows that corn yields in the last one-and-one-half centuries
have risen over 500%105 and there is much talk of heading for 300-bushel corn in the coming decades to
meet the global need.
U.S. Average Comn GrainYle d, 1863-002
0.
.9
Figure 28: US Average Corn Grain Yields, 1863-2002
in order to do that, the trends of mechanized, industrialized agriculture must continue. At the heart of
that systems are tractors and other electro-mechanical equipment for processing commodities in the
105 Source: University of Nebraska-Lincoln. See http://plantandsoil.unl.edu/croptechnology2005/pages/index.isp.
Observed October 22, 2010.
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field. The tractors and agricultural machinery business in the US is expected to be a $33.2B business in
2010. It is led by three companies:
* Deere & Company (20.6%)
e CNH (11.0%)
" AGCO Corporation107 (9.6%)
Those three firms represent the vast majority of the powered equipment portion of the market. Much
of the rest of the sector is in attachments, which are pulled and controlled by the powered equipment
from these three companies.
As with construction equipment, telematics in this market are not about "infotainment" and peace of
mind as they are in the passenger car segment, but instead telematics is about saving labor, reducing
inputs, and maximizing yields in a sustainable manner. Vehicle telemetry and GPS are some of the tools
not just of fleet management as with construction, but also of the science of precision agriculture.
Precision agriculture is defined by the U.S. National Research Council as "a management strategy that
uses information technologies to bring data from multiple sources to bear on decisions associated with
crop production" (Bouma et al., 1999). A commercially available precision agriculture solution is built on
three primary elements:
* Telematics system for automatic or guided steering (for the "where" information)
* Precision agriculture system (for the "what to apply" and "when to apply it" information)
" An office-based software package to manage and interpret the field data
3.4.2 - Analysis
Fleet Management and Precision Agriculture together make comparing features more difficult than with
construction equipment and passenger vehicles. Here, I won't repeat the pattern of the last two
segments of mapping features, but instead try to build on what we've seen. The biggest lesson of the
GM-OnStar-vs.-Ford-SYNC discussion was that choosing to develop a platform like this with an outside
partner does limit how deeply you can integrate. That fits intuition as well. One way to combat that is
to take the approach that Caterpillar took and partner deeply with someone with domain knowledge,
like - in their case - Trimble. While that does solve the short-term problem, it appears to be placing a
major source of long-term value creation away from the core of the company.
Here, we see that same dynamic play out again. As Table 15 shows, CNH and AGCO have no intrinsic
telematics or precision agriculture solutions. They rely on offerings from Trimble, and TOPCON. The
Trimble EZ-Guide offerings are marketed for CNH under the slogan108 "Put Your Farm on the Map."
AGCO offers automatic steering in the form of a product from TOPCON. It offers its own fleet telemetry-
Source: IBISWorld Industry Report 33311 - Tractors & Agricultural Machinery Manufacturing in the US - July
2010.
107 For more information about AGCO, please see Appendix A.
108 See http://www.putvourfarmonthemap.com. Observed October 22, 2010.
based management tool, AGCOMMAND 0 9. AGCO also offers a variety of software packages to increase
farm productivity, but it appears that AGCO Technology Solutions works with TOPCON"" in a manner
similar to Caterpillar in the construction space. As with the construction segment, Deere uses their
JDLink platform for telematics. Here, it is - in a sense - an element of the precision agriculture solution,
GreenStar.
Table 15: Elements of Major Precision Agriculture Systems
Company Telematics/Automatic Steering Precision Application Management Software
AGCO TOPCON FieldStar - developed with
TOPCON
CNH Trimble Trimble Trimble
John Deere John Deere JDLink (with some John Deere GreenStar John Deere Apex
help from QUALCOMM)
If we map all of these telematics players on a continuum and their approach
Figure 26 above, it would look this Figure 29 below:a Constc
For d Catrirnble
on a continuum, similar toAg:,
AG CO & Trimbie for
Topcon CNH
Figure 29: Positioning Telematics in a Company's Capability Chain for Cars, Ag, and Construction
We saw earlier that telematics - even in a market like passenger cars where it is largely a luxury and
there is not a business case driving it - can be very profitable. We also heard Ford indicate that it was
critical for nearly a third of their consumers in their purchase decision. What does that mean for
companies on the right side of Figure 26 and Figure 29? How much revenue and income are they "giving
away"? If mature markets seek the cost of capital, what does that mean for their future earnings? Is
there any reasonable possibility that backhoes and tractors won't go the way of cars and have products
that are "good enough" disrupting them from below in a Toyota-and-Honda-vs.-the-Detroit-Three-style
future? If so, it would seem that these are the features that will (1) differentiate, but (2) generate
revenue and income.
109 See http://www.agcocorp.com/technology.aspx. Observed October 22, 2010.
110 See http://www.topconpositioning.com/news-events/single/item/topcon-positioning-sVstems-tps-and-agco-
partner-to-help-farmers-become-more-efficient-by-using-il. Observed November 30, 2010.
Ag:
John Deere
The stakes here may be very high. The mechanized industrial metaphor has governed agriculture and
construction for over a century. We could be seeing the land-grab for positioning and market share that
defines the next century, and it is happening as markets globalize and much more of the world needs
access to equipment for processing food, fuel, and fiber, and for building infrastructure.
3.4.3 - Putting Some Numbers to It
As markets mature, margins - without differentiation (which can and often does come in the form of
complementary services) - deteriorate, as products - even highly complex ones as these are - approach
commodity status. That leaves that leaves the mature companies making the "iron" deploying more
capital for lesser returns. Said differently, they have to work much harder to earn less money.
By looking at the appropriate operating divisions within the companies building the equipment and the
divisions of the companies providing the telematics services platform, we would expect to see that
reflected in their financials. It is not possible in all cases because of the ways divisions are aligned. 1 but
it is possible to look at CNH's Ag sales and Trimble's Field Solutionsm
Trimble's Field Solutions divisions generates products and services that span more broadly than just
CNH, but since we are looking at relative numbers, and not absolute, the comparison is valid. We will
focus on Operating Profit Percentage as a simple measure of how "hard" a company has to work to
generate profit. By using operating profit, we are able to filter out the impact of lots of kinds of leverage
that are a part of a firm's bottom line.
Table 16 shows CNH's Ag Equipment division vs. Trimble's Field Solutions division over the last five
years. A longer window of time is possible, but five years is already two-to-three Moore's law
generations, and pushing back further than that in quickly evolving, high-tech fields brings its own
challenges. Trimble was solidly profitable each year, and their profitability appears to improve as they
achieve greater efficiencies and economies of scale. The right-most column shows average performance
over the five-year period, and Trimble's operating profit percentage over that period is over four times
that of CNH's Ag Equipment operations. Figure 30 shows their performance relative to each other
graphically.
i Deere, for example, does not break out its telematics services platform from the equipment divisions. While
that shows a more advanced understanding of services, it makes comparison more difficult. TOPCON is really best
thought of as a precision optics company that makes telematics as well, so all of the GPS "stuff" is lumped into one
division, making it tougher to tease out the relevant portions. That leaves us Cat, AGCO, CNH as equipment
provides and Trimble on the telematics side. Since AGCO does their work with TOPCON, we are down to looking at
Trimble, Cat, and CNH.
u2 This information from the Annual Reports and SEC 10-K's for CNH and Trimble.
Table 16: Comparing Trimble and CNH Ag Operating Profit 2005 - 2009
Measure/Year 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 Total
CNH Ag: Revenue ($M) 10,683 12,902 9,984 7,809 7,843 49,221
CNH Ag: Operating Profit ($M) 712 1,371 813 427 340 3,663
CNH Ag: Operating Profit (%) 6.66% 10.63% 8.14% 5.47% 4.34% 7.44%
Trimble Field Solutions: Revenue
($M) 292 301 201 139 127 1,060
Trimble Field Solutions:
Operating Profit ($M) 104 109 61 37 32 343
Trimble Field Solutions:
Operating Profit (%) 35.62% 36.21% 30.35% 26.62% 25.20% 32.36%
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Figure 30: CNH Ag vs. Trimble Field Solutions Operating Profit % 2005-2009
It is very difficult to isolate data adequately to perform a more thorough analysis, but results support the
notion that the premium that the market will bear for the advanced products and services that
complement and extend the product is greater than that of the equipment itself. While this does not
prove the idea, it certainly supports it.
3.5 - Tying It Together
We can extend the same notion of what we have seen with CNH and Trimble in section 3.4.3 to Cat,
CNH, and Trimble. Caterpillar reports three operating segments: machinery, engines, and financing.
We'll focus here on machinery sales and ignore engines and financing. Those data are presented below
in Table 17. Here, there are four sections: CNH Equipment, Cat Equipment CNH & Cat Equipment
totaled, and Trimble's Construction & Engineering division. As before, the right-most column shows
totals for the five-year period.
The first thing that is noticeable in Table 17 is that both equipment operations lost money in 2009 while
Trimble was profitable. In 2005 through 2008, while all were profitable, the equipment division had to
deploy a great deal more capital for a much smaller (in relative terms) return. The same notion is more
obvious when portrayed graphically as in Figure 31. While the macro-economic trends are clearly
evident, much more so than in the ag industry, the relative "ease" with Trimble makes money in the
same sector is evident as well. The equipment performance at their best in
Trimble's worst in 2009.
2006 is barely better than
Table 17: Comparing Trimble, CNH Construction, and Cat Operating Profit 2005 - 2009
Measure/Year 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 Total
CNH Construction Equipment:
Revenue ($M) 2,120 4,464 5,023 4,306 3,963 19,876
CNH Construction Equipment:
Operating Profit ($M) (339) 116 412 373 265 827
CNH Construction Equipment:
Operating Profit (%) -15.99% 2.60% 8.20% 8.66% 6.69% 4.16%
Caterpillar Equipment Operations:
Revenue ($M) 18,148 31,804 28,359 26,062 22,931 127,304
Caterpillar Equipment Operations:
Operating Profit ($M) (1,007) 1,803 2,758 3,027 2,431 9,012
Caterpillar Equipment Operations:
Operating Profit (%) -5.55% 5.67% 9.73% 11.61% 10.60% 7.08%
Cat & CNH Construction Equipment:
Revenue ($M) 20,268 36,268 33,382 30,368 26,894 147,180
Cat & CNH Construction Equipment:
Operating Profit ($M) (1,346) 1,919 3,170 3,400 2,696 9,839
Cat & CNH Construction Equipment:
Operating Profit (%) -6.64% 5.29% 9.50% 11.20% 10.02% 6.69%
Trimble Construction & Engineering:
Revenue ($M) 579 742 743 637 524 3,225
Trimble Construction & Engineering:
Operating Profit ($M) 58 126 174 136 118 612
Trimble Construction & Engineering:
Operating Profit (%) 10.02% 16.98% 23.42% 21.35% 22.52% 18.98%
Cat & CNH Constr. Equipment Ops vs. Trimble
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Figure 31: CNH & Cat Construction vs. Trimble Constr. & Eng. Operating Profit % 2005 - 2009
Looking at the idea a little differently, as an investor, if you had placed $100 each in Caterpillar, Trimble,
and an S&P 500 index fund in December of 2004 and re-invested all of the dividends for the five-year
period, Figure 32 shows how you would have fared. It is important to note that this is at an aggregate
level...not just the operating divisions presented in Table 17. While both out-performed the broader
market, Trimble out-performed Caterpillar by nearly 50%.
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Figure 32: Comparing Total Market Returns for Caterpillar and Trimble
One could argue that perhaps this is a false dichotomy because someone has to make the equipment.
While that is true, the point here is that the services revenue is too attractive to leave to someone else,
and since margins on the iron seem to erode over time, it becomes more important when we look at
longer time windows. Additionally, we saw in the last chapter that a company can successfully de-
emphasize its hardware strategy over time as IBM has and still hold credibility (and generate revenue) in
113services3
3.6 - Telematics Systems as Platforms
Tractors are the CPUs of industrial agriculture. That is to say, you don't buy a tractor for what it does by
itself; you buy it to power a system. It powers your operations around seeding, crop care, and other
utility operations. That means that there is a platform play here. While the tractor makes it the most
obvious, it is true for other agricultural and construction equipment as well. A combine does nothing
without a (crop-specific) header. Construction equipment creates value with buckets, blades, and other
attachments.
m We'll see that trend with IBM even more in Chapter 4 when we look at their telematics solution and how it
enables them to deliver vehicle telematics services and solutions.
Chapter 4 - Value-Based Services
Based on the framework for complex systems proposed by de Weck and Magee presented in Chapter 1,
the last type of services for product-service systems this thesis will present is value-based services.
Value-based services - as they will be defined here - are in many ways different from the other types of
services presented and discussed in this thesis. Value-based services are defined - for our purposes - in
how they are structured more than what they represent. That is to say value-based services will have
elements of product-based services, information-based services, and other value-based services. What
defines them is their "service-ness" over "product-ness." We call them value-based services, because
they are focused on the value created by the collection of services that surround the product itself. In
the extreme cases, the product fades away and all the consumer sees is the service. Value-based
services are primarily about how the product-service system is packaged.
4.1 - Value-Based Services - a Framework
Value-based services are those where the "product-ness" disappears and the service element of the
product service system is front-and-center in the measure of value.
In the most basic form, value-based services are what are traditionally thought of as financial services,
where the payment is more tuned (even if slightly) to consumption.
In more advanced forms, value-based services completely servitize the product, and the job for which
the product was needed is the focus and the measure of the service. In the cases I have observed of
services that fit this definition, those two attributes tend to be additive. That is to say, first comes the
payment model and then the transformation of the products to focus on the related services. That is
more a heuristic than a rule.
In some of the most advanced cases of value-based services, that service bundle that surrounds the
product is able to exploit under-utilization of the product on the consumer side, as well as potentially
generate economies of scale and/or scope on the service product side to create utilities, the extreme of
value-based services.
As a simple example, a car is primarily a product, a taxi is a value-based service, and a subway is a utility
Figure 33 portrays the idea graphically
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Figure 33: Value-based Services in terms of a passenger car
4.2 - The Product-Service Spectrum of Cars for Value-Based Services
While not exhaustive, the following examples - as portrayed in Figure 33 above- illustrate the product-
service continuum for cars and associated value-based services. On the left side of the figure, there are
pure products; on the right, pure services. As we move from the left to the right, and the "product-
ness" starts to fade, we begin to focus on the "service-ness", which is the value proposition we are
seeking from the product - what HBS Professor Clay Christensen might call the job we hired the product
to do" 4. That right side of the diagram is what I am calling value-based services. We value them based
on the service attributes of the product-service system, not the product attributes. The degree to which
we do that is the degree to which it is a value-based service.
4.2.1 - Cash Purchase
At the pure product end of the spectrum exists a used car purchased in cash. I give the example of a
used car because it is more likely to simply be "caveat emptor" and without warranty, which can itself
be thought of as a value- and/or product-based service, depending on how you consider it and how you
pay for it. While the driver will likely carry insurance, the purchase transaction of the car itself is almost
114 See "What Customers Want from Your Products: http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/5170.html. Observed December
28, 2010.
a pure product"'5 . The consumer will own the car indefinitely- until he or she finds someone else to
buy it or until it is disposed at end-of-life and the payment stream has no correlation to the
consumption. Additionally, there are almost no services packaged or co-produced. It's just a car. As
has been discussed throughout this thesis, that is in many ways a conceptualized ideal at this point with
warranties, extended warranties, tire warranties, XM, telematics, oil change and routine maintenance
service, and the like.
4.2.2 - New Car - Warranty & Finance
For most car purchases, there are two obvious financial services attached to the product at the time of
purchase: financing, which makes the payment for the product a financial service, and warranty 16 . For
a warranty, either the base warranty that comes with a car or an extended warranty purchased for an
extra fee, parts and knowledge about them that would be needed for failures are turned into a financial
stream of payments. This financing is the "traditional" value-based service. We start to see the
payment stream match the consumption model. In that sense the payments begin to be a co-produced
service with the product.
4.2.3 - Car Lease
A car lease extends the "service-ness" of the product by allowing the consumer to align the payment
even more closely with the consumption than a loan. At the end of the lease, the vehicle will have value
that could actually be sold as a product, but it will be owned by the leasing company, and the consumer
will be "off the hook." In a perfect lease, the leasee has paid for the amount of product value they
received - no more and no less- and they are left with no product either. Here, the focus is still on the
product, but it is beginning to be transformed to a service.
4.2.4 - Car Rental
Rental more closely aligns consumption with the financial transaction, but is still centered on the
product. Elements of the product, not a service, are still evident as the renter re-fuels, worries about
navigation, pays for parking, and keeps possession of the car while not using it during the rental period.
The smallest unit of rental is normally one day, and it often sits unused much of that time. The payment
model is matched at a much more granular level to the consumption of the product, but the consumer
stills thinks of it in product terms. When I get back from a business trip, my wife or kids will often ask,
"what kind of rental car did you have?" That is a product question, not a service question.
4.2.5 - Car Sharing
With car sharing services like Zipcar 17 , a little more of the product starts to go away as insurance,
parking, and re-fueling are generally bundled with the rental/consumption, and consumption periods
can be as short as one hour. With most car sharing services, the focus is on simplicity and there are
115 Even here, there are "lemon laws" of one form or another, depending on the state, that protect that buyer and
are most easily understood as a sort of financial service...there are no pure products, and there are not pure
services...only product-service systems.
116 There is also automotive insurance, but that just muddies the waters, so we are not considering it here. It will
be discussed briefly later in the chapter when we look at IBM "Pay as You Drive".
For more information please see http://www.zipcar.com. Observed September 12, 2010.
pricing plans aligned with the consumption model. The consumer is really just worried about navigation
and driving, and is not paying for the asset (the product component) when it is not needed. Here, the
service starts to become more evident and the product starts to fade.
4.2.6 - Taxi
On the other end of the spectrum from a car purchase is a taxi cab, which is available simply to fulfill the
job of taking you from one place to another at a moment's notice for a usage-based fee. The cab driver
handles navigation and driving as well as insurance, licenses, tolls, etc. The consumer pays for exactly
what is needed, exactly when it is needed. Here, you have a product acting as a platform for bundling a
series of taktchronously co-produced services that leverage product-based and information-based
services to create a rich product-service system that is paid for as it is needed. Unless it is something
novel, like a hybrid car, we are likely not even to notice what kind of car the cab driver was driving,
because we engaged him for the service, not the "naked" product.
4.2.7 - Subway
Beyond the taxi, a subway completely hides the product-ness as does a taxicab, but also adds a notion of
centralization that allows it to create an economy of scale that enables the service to be delivered for
much less than a taxi. In doing so, consumers sacrifice some flexibility, but they also have even less to
worry about.
All of these options, of course, exist in a much larger and more diverse ecosystem of transportation
options which includes walking, biking, as well as non-consumption, and substitution (e.g.
telecommuting). Those, while interesting, are not to be considered here.
4.3 - Product-Service Spectrum in Different Language
In the example above (in Figure 33) as we move from the product end of the continuum to the service
end, the focus becomes less on the car and more act of transit - the underlying service or need. On the
product end, you are buying a car. On the service end, you are consuming a ride, and the "car-ness"
becomes much less important and much more transparent.
Said another way, on the product end, you are buying a form, but on the service end, you are consuming
a function (i.e., form = car, function = transportation). For English majors, on the product end you are
buying the subject of a sentence, but on the services end you are consuming the verb and direct object
(i.e., subject = car, verb + direct object = moves passengers). For MIT Engineering Systems Division
students, an operand performs processing on an object (i.e., car = operand, transporting = process,
passenger = object). For an accountant, the product is a capital expense (CapEx), and the servitization
converts it to an operational expense (OpEx). Those various expressions of the same idea are captured
in Figure 34 below.
Operand Process Object
Car [-- rnprigPeople
Figure 34: Various Expressions/Languages of the Servitization of Products
4.4 - Financial Services in the Heavy Equipment Industry
The most basic value-based services, financing, do not completely align the payment model to the
consumption of the product and the production of the related services, but they begin to do so.
Financing is important to the product providers for two main reasons:
* They enable product sales
e They generate stable, long-term revenue streams.
In most cases, companies do it for both reasons, but those can be separate motives, separate strategies.
In terms of product-based services discussed in Chapter 2, "enabling product sales" could be equated to
GE's approach to using services to extend their products. Simply generating stable revenue streams
could be equated to Deere's Nortrax. It captures value, but creates no new synergies.
As a pure example from another industry of using financing as an enabler of product sales, a privately
held department store chain based in the Midwest, Von Maur, offers an interest-free charge card118 . It
is a revolving line of credit where you pay of a minimum of about 20% of your outstanding balance each
month. Since they are based in the heartland and cater to an upscale clientele, it is reasonable to
assume that their risk of default is very low, but they still are taking on a cost for not getting their money
as soon. Doing so "protects" the products. Contrast that approach with many big-box furniture stores
that almost sell the furniture at a loss in order to provide financing.
See http://www.vonmaur.com/Defaut.aspx?Pageld=13&nt=4. Observed December 26, 2010.
As has been mentioned elsewhere in this thesis and discussed extensively in other works, financing can
be relatively easy money to make compared to the scale of capital required to build products. In a
manner similar to how we compared Trimble to the equipment makers in Chapter 3, Table 18 compares
the Finance Operation of Caterpillar and Deere to the Equipment Operation of Caterpillar and Deere
119,120over the last seven years
Table 18: Comparing Operating Profit of Equipment Sales to Financing Activity for Cat and Deere 2003-2009
Statistic/Year 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 Total
Cat Equip.: Revenue ($M) 18,148 31,804 28,359 26,062 22,931 18,844 13,678 159,826
Cat Equip.: Operating Profit ($M) (1,007) 1,803 2,758 3,027 2,431 1,756 1,199 11,967
Cat Equip.: Operating Profit (%) -6% 6% 10% 12% 11% 9% 9% 7%
Deere Equip. Revenue ($M) 20,756 25,803 21,489 19,884 19,401 17,673 13,349 138,355
Deere Equip.: Operating Profit
($M) 1,365 2,927 2,318 1,905 1,842 1,905 708 12,970
Deere Equip.: Operating Profit (%) 7% 11% 11% 10% 9% 11% 5% 9%
Deere & Cat Combined Equip.: 38,904 57,607 9,848 45,946 42,332 36,517 27,027 298,181
Revenue ($M) 38,904 57,607 9,848 423 6 77 8
Deere & Cat Combined Equip.: 358 4,730 5,076 4,932 4,273 3,661 1,907 24,937
Operating Profit ($M) 358 4,730 5,076 4,932 4,273 3,661 1,907 24,937
Deere & Cat Combined Equip.: 1% 8% 10% 11% 10% 10% 7% 8%
Operating Profit (%) 1% 8% 10% 11% 10% 10% 7% 8%
Cat Finance: Revenue ($M) 2,856 3,280 2,996 2,648 2,333 1,970 1,759 17,842
Cat Finance: Operating Profit ($M) 381 579 690 670 531 470 393 3,714
Cat Finance: Operating Profit (%) 13% 18% 23% 25% 23% 24% 22% 21%
Deere Finance: Revenue ($M) 2,178 2,447 2,370 2,035 1,687 1,492 1,556 13,765
Deere Finance: Operating Profit
($M) 223 478 548 520 491 466 474 3,200
Deere Finance: Operating Profit (%) 10% 20% 23% 26% 29% 31% 30% 23%
Deere & Cat Combined Finance: 5,034 5,727 5,366 4,683 4,020 3,462 3,315 31,607
Revenue ($M)
Deere & Cat Combined Finance: 604 1,057 1,238 1,190 1,022 936 867 6,914
Operating Profit ($M) 60I105 12 19 10 936 867 6,914
Deere & Cat Combined Finance: 12% 18% 23% 25% 25% 27% 26% 22%
Operating Profit (%) 12%118% 23%_ 25% 25% 27% 26% 22%
119 AGCO was not included here because it does not do its own financing. It works through Rabobank. As such, it
was not possible to isolate that portion of the Rabobank portfolio. CNH was not included here because they did
not report in a basis consistent with Cat and Deere making a direct comparison more difficult.
Deere includes their engine sales as a part of equipment operations, whereas Cat breaks it out. These numbers
do not include Cat's, but do include Deere's. Deere is primarily and engine provider to itself. Beyond supplying to
itself, Cat's engine division makes much, much larger engines that are sold through a separate channel.
When the combined results are presented graphically as they are in Figure 35, as in the previous chapter
with Trimble and the equipment companies, the worst years of financing are comparable to the best
years of equipment operations - even with the strongest and healthiest firms in the heavy equipment
industry, Cat & Deere.
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Figure 35: Comparing Operating Profit of Equipment to Financing for Cat and Deere 2003-2009
4.5 - IBM Pay as You Drive (PAYD)
As was observed in Chapter 2, IBM's essential skill is understanding complex processes and develop and
marshal product knowledge for anyone's products. They have long ago abandoned their roots as simply
a provider of computing machines and that is now the smallest part of their business in terms of
revenue, and even smaller yet when seen in terms of income.
In 2007, IBM was contracted by Norwich Union - the largest car insurance provider in the UK - to
develop a model where insurance was based not on probabilities derived from demographics but on
actual, telemetrically provided, vehicle performance datam. IBM puts it this way:
IBM will provide the hardware, software, and the actual in-car "black box" for Norwich Union.
The box will use telematics-combining wireless communications and global positioning satellite
(GPS) technology-to measure vehicle usage and transmit data through a mobile phone
121 See http://www-935.ibm.com/services/fr/index.wss/summary/igs/a1005608?cntxt=a1003234 for more
information. Observed November 30, 2010. Unless specified otherwise, all information in this section is from the
article available at that link.
network from Orange Communications. The customer's monthly bill will be calculated based on
his or her individual driving data.
The article goes on to say that "Norwich Union is also researching ways to leverage the technology
behind Pay as You Drive to offer additional services such as on demand driving directions, stolen-vehicle
tracking and direct connection to emergency services-a natural progression of the on demand
technology."
"Pay as You Drive" is a slight twist on other value-based services, in that the item of which payment is
being scaled to consumption is not a product, but another financial service - here, car insurance.
Reflecting back on the examples from Chapter 3, there is also a strong telematics component here as
IBM actually built the "black box" to provide that functionality.
4.6 - Rolls Royce TotalCare
About half of Rolls Royce's revenue comes from services. The most interesting service in the Rolls Royce
portfolio offers consumers of their aero engines the option to bundle all the operational aspects and buy
simply "power by the hour." They have - in essence - completely servitized the engine through their
TotalCare servicem. In their words, "[a]gainst an agreed cost per flying hour, TotalCare offers the
opportunity to remove uncertainties from engine management and provides greater financial
confidence from managing predictable costs." This value-based service exhibits all three "layers" that
we have discussed earlier in the chapter:
e Payment tied to consumption: Pay-as-you-go for the service of the jet engine.
* Packaging of novel product-based or finance-based services to generate a premium over the
product. Those include:
o Operational Support
= Technical support
- Asset management
" Line support
o Repair & overhaul
- Planned shop visit
- Unplanned off-wing maintenance
- Accessory repair & overhaul
o Information management
" Engine Health monitoring
" Engine management
" Technical publications
e Exploiting an economy of scale on the production side of the service and an underutilization on
the consumption side or both through some sort of centralization: here, the under-utilization is
the equipment and staff required to support a jet engine.
m See http://www.rolls-royce.com/civil/services/totalcare/. Observed November 26, 2010.
We again see - perhaps even more so than with the IBM PAYD example - not just the product-based
services enumerated above, but all of the types of services we have discussed in this paper because
telematics capabilities are required to measure the systems. While they give no other details about the
telematics capabilities, they do say this:
Our aerospace operations centres are a good illustration of this capability. In dedicated facilities
serving airline, corporate and defence customers, these Rolls-Royce centres collect real-time
data from our engines as they are operating around the world, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.
By analysing, sharing and acting upon this information we can optimise the performance of our
engines in service. The centres are a focal point for service delivery, assessing the condition of
the fleet and directing logistics and field maintenance.
Extending the GE model - as discussed in Chapter 2 - here we have the performance data not just
reporting failures sooner, but - in a virtuous cycle - potentially getting it directly to the design engineers
to improve the product. Figure 36 extends the ideas of Figure 14 and Figure 15 in Chapter 2 to portray
the notion graphically. Here, Rolls Royce is using services not just to protect or increase product sales,
but to enhance the product itself.
Figure 36: How D-l-K-W Flow at Companies like GE: Use Services to Enhance Products
One of the best measures of success of the TotalCare service is that, according to their 2009 Annual
Report12 3, 45% of their civil fleet is enrolled for at least some of those services enumerated above. A
good measure of its importance to Rolls Royce management is its appearance in the KPI's ("Percentage
of Civil Fleet under Management" and "Underlying Services Revenue" - 59%).
Additionally, while Rolls Royce is continuing to globalize their manufacturing footprint (20 countries) and
service footprint (over 50 countries), they are not "hollowing out" their UK base as they do it. They have
invested E1.8B ($2.8B) in the UK over the last decade and E300M ($470M) in the last year. Information-
based services like the telematics offerings from the Rolls Royce Group leverage deep product
knowledge. By getting operational data directly to the design and manufacturing engineers, they are
able to improve future designs, but they are also able to diagnose and prognosticate (prognose?)
problems. Doing so has some significant impacts on knowledge management and value creation.
13 Unless specified otherwise, information in this section is from the Rolls Royce Group 2009 Annual Report.
Conceive..! LOperate
For the civil aero operating division of Rolls Royce, 59% of revenue came from services. Although this is
an exaggeration, as with the birthday cake example in Chapter 1, they are moving toward giving away
the engine, in a sense, as a part of the total solution.
Rolls Royce also provides extensive design services for the engines that they sell of all sizes - in the
marine, aero, and oil & gas platform divisions. They are also extending the TotalCare business model to
the other divisions as well.
4.7 - Bombardier FlexJet
Bombardier 2 4 takes value-based services one step further and servitizes not just the engine, but the
entire jet through their FlexJet program for fractional ownership. 125 FlexJet allows customers to pick
whether they want:
* Fractional ownership where "users pay predictable monthly management and usage fees, while
FlexJet manages aircraft maintenance, flight crews, hangars, fuel, and insurance on their
behalf."
* Jet card - allowing users to use craft on a per-use basis across the FlexJet fleet.
" Whole aircraft management, where FlexJet handles all the maintenance costs for an owned
craft.
In all cases, again we see the three elements of the most compelling value-based services:
* Payment tied to consumption
" Value-creating service production tied to consumption
e Economy of scale and underutilization leveraged.
Additionally, by making ownership and usage easier, they are also expanding the pie, and enablement is
the most basic purpose of value-based services. For their jet division, services accounted for over 14.5%
of their revenue. They accounted for a comparable percentage for their rolling stock (train and subway)
division.
4.8 - Microsoft: Cloud on the Horizon, Storm Brewing Ahead
If you are a taxi cab driver, as presented earlier, the services bundle that you are able to package with a
passenger car allow you to charge a premium over the cost of the product at the core of the product-
service system. That is, of the 30-plus dollar cab fare to get from Logan airport to MIT's campus, the
actual cost of the car for those minutes is small. In that case, value-based services are attractive to the
provider. In that case, taxi cabs actually extend the market for passenger cars as well, because buying a
car to get me from Logan to MIT and then selling it is not a practically alternative, so in that sense, the
124 For more information about Bombardier, please see Appendix A.
1s Unless specified otherwise, information in this section is from the Bombardier 2009 Annual Report.
whole car ecosystem wins. If there are losers, they are in related ecosystems, like the Boston's "T"
mass-transit system where it really is an either-or scenario: either I will take a cab or I will ride the T.
In other markets, value-based services do not present such an obviously attractive alternative to the sale
of the naked product for the product providers. Commercial software may be one such field. In the
end, commodity prices and expanding markets tend to create more value, but it's not always (not
often?) for the incumbents in a market in transition. The history of Information Technology is littered
with winners from one era being the losers of the next. Three decades ago, Microsoft was the up-and-
comer leading (at IBM's anointing) the PC revolution. Today, they are battling the transition to cloud-
based computing which very much fits our definition of a value-based service, and the transition ahead
for them will be very bumpy.
Conceptually, cloud computing can be thought of on the same continuum as passenger transportation in
Figure 33 earlier in this chapter. It is expanded here for those purposes below in Figure 37. Just as with
a car, a traditional computer can be purchased or leased. Those are not fundamentally different
products...just a different financial instrument packaged around it that may help enable the purchase
and that begins to tie payment to consumption.
The more interesting examples are on the "Pure Service" end of the continuum. Grid computing, similar
to car sharing services like Zipcar or traditional car rental discussed earlier in this chapter, allows you to
rent processing (or storage or bandwidth) as needed. As with a rental car, you are still responsible for
directing the resource usage, but it is an operational expense sized to the usage and many of the
maintenance activities are no longer yours to handle. Sun - now a part of Oracle - is perhaps the best-
known grid provider.
126 See http://www.oracle.com/us/products/tools/oracle-grid-engine-075549.htm for more information.
Observed November 21, 2010.
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Figure 37: The Product-Service continuum for Passenger Cars and Computers
Cloud computing pushes that notion much further. Just as you simply consume the services of a subway
by choosing where to let it take you, you simply consume the services of the cloud - a complete
application architecture available through a browser that scales on demand. Here, you also make the
sacrifices in accepting standards as you would with a subway, but it has the benefits of giving the
consumer much less about which to worry...that's why you can read on the subway - because so much
is being taken care of for you.
Michael Armbrust has written some of the clearest academic work on cloud computing. He defines a
cloud as a computing platform that exhibits three attributes (Armbrust et al., 2010):
* the appearance of infinite computing resources on demand
* the elimination of an upfront commitment
* the ability to pay for (roughly) usage-based consumption
Others have described is as follows: "A Cloud is a type of parallel and distributed system consisting of a
collection of inter-connected and virtualized computers that are dynamically provisioned and presented
as one or more unified computing resource(s) based on service-level agreements established through
negotiations between service providers and consumers."(Buyya et al., 2009).
Said more succinctly, cloud computing appears infinite, immediate, and elastic to its consumers - like a
utility.
This is much more than just re-packaging the financial transaction as with leasing a server. New data
centers on the scale of companies like Google, Microsoft, and Amazon (50,000 to 100,000 servers) are
able to achieve efficiencies of five to seven times that of traditional, mid-sized data centers (5,000 to
10,000 servers) (Armbrust et al., 2010). Coupled with system utilization of 5% to 20% in traditional,
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existing data centers, the potential for order-of-magnitude overall efficiency improvements is with
reason. Very different applications architectures are required to take advantage of the cloud, which will
throw away much of the investments in legacy systems, but the economics are so compelling that many
will not be able to (and should not) resist.
As Nicolas Carr points out in a compelling manner in "The Big Switch - Rewiring the World from Edison
to Google," the similarities between the cloud revolution and the electric revolution about a century
earlier are significant 27. In the late 1800s, power was based on the water: a local, custom-built system
where physical proximity was very important because of limits in transmission capabilities. In a few
years, steam power (still derived from water) generated more power with limited ability to transmit
locally, but centralization was still not practical.
As with all systems based on what economists call General Purpose Technologies (Carr, 2008), the ability
to stop building to meet a localized peak utilization and consume on-demand creates compelling scale
economies. That's what makes a great value-based service: the ability to exploit inefficiencies on either
the production or consumption side (here, both) and sell the technology at the right quantization.
Leasing a car or a server is okay, but it does not cause a massive disruption. This does.
To be clear, services are absolutely not a bad thing for a information technology company. They are an
important part of the revenue mix, and they provide long-term stability that product sales cannot. For
Microsoft, the challenge is that the margin on traditional, shrink-wrapped commercial software is simply
staggering and that the cloud as a service model is a shot to the heart of their two largest products:
Windows and Office.
In the last five years, Salesforce.com has become a stronger and stronger player in the cloud
computing/software-as-a-service business. Some say that they were the first to commercialize it. They
offer a customer relationship management (CRM) system (and a growing list of other services) for a
simple monthly fee. No servers, no software...just launch a browser and get to work. That is very, very
threatening to the Microsoft model. An exhaustive study is beyond the scope of this paper, but simply
put, if Microsoft represents the way software companies have done business in the past and
Salesforce.com represents the way that business will be done in the future, the transition ahead for
Microsoft is tough. Table 19 shows the operating profit for each company for the last five years, and
Figure 38 portrays it graphically. While the Cloud will certainly create a much larger pie, it's hard to get
excited about 6% when you are used to 37%.
Beyond specific citations, this section is influenced strongly by two works. Both are excellent reads. The first
compares the cloud to electric power. The second tells the story of the electrifying the world: (1) Carr N.G. (2008)
The big switch : rewiring the world, from Edison to Google. 1st ed. W. W. Norton & Co., New York. (2) Jonnes J.
(2003) Empires of light : Edison, Tesla, Westinghouse, and the race to electrify the world. 1st ed. Random House,
New York.
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Table 19: Operating Profit - Microsoft vs. Salesforcecom
Statistic/Year 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 Total
Microsoft: Revenue ($M) 62,484 58,437 60,420 51,122 44,282 276,745
Microsoft: Operating Profit ($M) 24,098 20,363 22,271 18,438 16,380 101,550
Microsoft: Operating Profit (%) 39% 35% 37% 36% 37% 37%
Salesforce.com: Revenue ($M) 1,305,583 1,076,769 748,700 497,098 309,857 3,938,007
Salesforce.com: Operating Profit ($M) 115,272 63,742 20,369 (358) 20,102 219,127
Salesforce.com: Operating Profit (%) 9% 6% 3% 0% 6% 6%
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Figure 38: Comparing Operating Profit of Microsoft and Salesforce.com 2006-2010
As Table 20 shows, when it comes to the Cloud, no matter how tough the coming change, Microsoft is
clearly taking on all comers. Microsoft has done the right thing making sure that they are involved in
practically all the emerging online, cloud-centric markets128 . They are even beginning to turn around
their terrible (absent) strategy around mobile devices that drive access to the web, with Windows
Mobile 7 and the recent announcement of developing Windows for ARM processors129
Besides some basic aggregation tools, Microsoft has not yet made a significant attempt in social media.
129 See http://news.cnet.com/8301-13924 3-20026354-64.html. Observed December 26, 2010.
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Table 20: Microsoft vs. the World in the Cloud
Microsoft Offering Competitive Offering
Dynamics CRM Salesforce.com
Bing (including Yahoo! search) Google Search
Azure Google App Engine
Hotmail Google Gmail
Office 365 Google App Engine
Bing Maps Google Earth
MSN Yahoo!
For the online businesses of Microsoft, a utility computing model will be profitable, but it will mean the
death of Windows as a PC and server operating system and Office as a PC application. It is hard to beat
the gross margins of commercial software. While we will almost certainly see a less profitable Microsoft
in the future, utilities like what the Cloud is building can be exceptionally stable and highly profitable
companies. Just as IBM turned the corner to become a very different but profitable company in the
product services world, Microsoft faces the chance to do the same in the utility world. As they have
shown for decades, they are an amazing and tenacious competitor.
4.9 - Tying It Together
We've seen in Chapter 4 that value-based services are about how you package the product-service
system: focus on the product or focus on the service that consumers want the product to provide. For
the cab driver, it creates an opportunity. For Microsoft, a threat.
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Chapter 5 - Conclusions
"Digital Technology is to the service revolution as steam was to the industrial revolution."
- Dr. Irving Wladawsky-Berger, Visiting Lecturer at
MIT Sloan and MIT's Engineering Systems
Division130
5.1 - A Brief Review
Before drawing some conclusions about the best way to approach services for product-centric
companies, let's review what we've discussed so far.
Chapter 1 briefly reviewed the troubled attempts to categorize and even define services from Scottish
economist Adam Smith forward and ultimately concluded that to define products and services apart
from each other is a false dichotomy. We leaned on the language of Teboul to put things in terms of
"front stage" and "back stage" and pointed toward the definition from Tang & Zhou: "a solution
performed for consideration with a taktchronously co-produced product-IHIP solution to create a
stream of benefits." There are no pure products and there are no pure services. Each thing that is
consumed is a balance of the two. Then, we looked briefly at how to categorize services and proposed
that it could be useful - based on the work of de Weck and Magee - to talk about product-based,
information-based, and value-based services as elements of product-service systems. Those three types
defined the study of the next three chapters. There is not a consistent methodology on how the
services and their related products are analyzed and presented. Chapters 2 - 4 then each briefly looked
into those different types of service offerings, each shamelessly acknowledging that it is a snapshot into
an element or two of the totality of services and product-service systems.
Chapter 2 focused on product-based services. The first part of the chapter focused on leading
indicators and trends that fewer and fewer product-based services need the brick-and-mortar world.
Companies that accept that reality, like Best Buy, Netflix, and Redbox appear to thrive. Companies that
ignore it, like Blockbuster and Circuit City, perish. The chapter points out that product-based services
must be progressively more experiential to merit the transactional costs of brick-and-mortar
environments, and that consumers in more-and-more markets want - or perhaps demand - multi-
channel delivery models, letting them choose based on the product and the overall transaction. We
boiled all that down to the idea that successful companies exceed customer expectations for trade not
in the quality of the product and what will be paid for it, but in the totality of the experience including
product and services, and that the frontier of customer expectations is not at all static.
The last part of the chapter was less consumer-service-oriented. We looked at Deere and a couple of
on-going supply chain integration efforts:
130 From Dr. Wladawsky-Berger's presentation at the 2010 MIT SDM Systems Thinking Conference, held at the MIT
Media Lab, October21 & 22, Cambridge, MA.
105
" John Deere's Nortrax captures existing value by acquiring Deere's construction equipment
dealers.
* LESCO became a part of the John Deere Landscapes to support Deere's "One Source" strategy
which creates value by integrating across previous boundaries in the supply chain between
products, retail services, financing, and installation.
We also looked at GE and IBM where we saw what appear as more advanced approaches toward
services:
" We saw that GE uses its services business to re-enforce and in some ways protect their product
business. They recognize their service capabilities as a competitive advantage.
" We saw that IBM has de-emphasized their traditional product business (hardware) in favor of
services. While they certainly also sell lots of software very profitably, services is the largest
piece of the business.
Chapter 3 focused on telematics as one interesting example of information-based services and showed
that there are two primary approaches: integrate like GM and John Deere, or partner (with varying
strengths of partnership), like Ford, Caterpillar, AGCO, and CNH. The approach chosen appears to have
near-term impacts on product architecture and the knowledge domains from which the telematics
system can most effectively draw that should impact the choice.
We saw, first, that telematics can be a very profitable business based on what we could infer about
GM's OnStar. Further, we observed that where companies are choosing to keep telematics services far
from the product core, they could be giving away their future. We are treating as axiomatic that
products seek the cost of capital in efficient markets, and that these services are where the value
creation can come as the core product's value proposition declines. To illustrate, we looked at
Caterpillar and CNH and their advanced technology partner Trimble and compared their financial
performance in recent years. We saw that, while both Cat and Trimble beat the S&P 500 over the last
five year a and both were financially solid companies, Trimble beat the S&P by a whole lot more and
Caterpillar had to deploy lots more capital per unit of profit than Trimble. From that, I questioned
whether it was good for Cat to give away the really profitable stuff, especially in the long-term.
We also mentioned the notion that products like tractors and backhoes are platforms and that there is
an opportunity to develop there. We see Ford starting to develop that notion with their family of
related products.
Chapter 4 proposed that there are three different levels, or layers, of value-based services:
* Enable: Make the payment model more closely match the consumption model. This can and
normally is profitable, but it is best thought of as just an enabler to get a company's products to
their customers (think, "car financing").
* Servitize: Package the product with novel services (generally product-based, but in some cases
finance-based and IT-based) and tie the production of those services to the cadence of
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consumption. That novel packaging of services is what enables the service provider to charge an
attractive premium over the "rent" of the core product alone (think, "taxi").
e Utilitize: Exploit an economy of scale or scope on the production side and/or an underutilization
on the consumption side to create what is essentially a utility. If the price-performance curve is
adequately disruptive, customers will take lesser performance for the standardized services
(think, "subway").
It was also shown how cloud computing fits that model and what the emergence of a new utility (a "fifth
utility" (Buyya et al., 2009) along with water, gas, electricity, and telephone) appears to be doing to that
ecosystem by looking at its impact on other companies, both suppliers to the utility, creators of the
utility and consumers of the utility.
We also reviewed more transportation sector finance-based utilities and saw that same trend from
Chapter 3 to protect and extend knowledge assets with services.
All that leads us to here. So what?
5.2 - The Problem with Products
When taken in context, there are two recent product manufacturing processes that have staggering
implications for product-centric systems: commercial-grade Linux and the Boeing 787 Dreamliner. Let's
look briefly at each of them.
5.2.1 - Linux
Linux is an open-source, commercial-grade operating system. A decade ago, that would have sounded
like an oxymoron. In this context, I mean "commercial-grade" in the sense that more than hobbyists are
using it and that it is being used as a replacement for what would have been previously purchased
operating systems. With all due respect to Linus Torvalds, nobody really "owns" Linux. It develops by
the wisdom of the crowd. There have certainly been some very key contributions by the commercial
world to make it viable for production workloads on multi-processor systems, and the motives behind
those "contributions" were business-driven, and not altruistic, but it has been done. Linux is significant
here for two reasons.
* First, product complexity used to be one of the barriers to entry into markets. There are few
things designed and implemented by people than robust, commercial operating systems, and
they no longer require profit-driven corporations to make them happen. "Why" is a fascinating
subject that I would argue has much common ground with the issues and trends observed in
Chapter 2 that are assaulting brick-and-mortar-centric product-based services, but for our
purposes, I am hoping we can leave the "why" question alone and just recognize the trend.
* Second, even something that complex has a tough time recovering the cost of capital.
Competition is so stiff that companies will help give away products to get into the services
business that surrounds it. That sounds bad for product companies.
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5.2.2 -787 Dreamliner
The Boeing13 787 Dreamliner is another example of complexity in the built world. Just as operating
systems can be thought of as the apex of digital product complexity, so can the same be said of airliners
for the commercial, build-to-order electro-mechanical world. As has been the case for decades, the
manufacturing of Boeing's latest commercial jet is highly distributed. When the dollars are as large as
they are for commercial jets, countries prefer to buy from a supplier where there is some local content.
Boeing has taken it a major step further, though. They did not just outsource fabrication and assembly
around the world; they outsourced design13 1. This approach has not been without issues, but to
consider doing so means that those capabilities exist outside of their "walls," and - in some sense -
means that it has been commoditized. The impact on integration testing, assembly, and agility - just to
mention a few capabilities - is also fascinating, but our focus here is on the fact that they could go
outside of the boundaries of their company to design major sections of the one of the most complex
products in the built world.
5.2.3 - Products Are Not Enough
Together, I am extrapolating a commercial-grade, open-source operating system, and outsourcing major
design elements of an airliner to point to a problem with being just a product company. When the item
for consumption can be completely described, it can be completely compared, and in efficient markets,
its price will seek the cost of capital and no more, leaving no economic value created for shareholders
on the product alone. For Western nations, with higher labor costs, that will always end poorly for a
"pure" product offering. There was a time when services could be a differentiator, and that is still true,
but at the same time, I am arguing that they are now a part of survival. Simply put, products are now -
in many cases - just the price of admission.
5.3 - How Then to Approach Services?
Pulling what we have seen together, perhaps a services strategy starts with three questions. We'll
consider these questions at the company level here. In practice, the decisions are made at a much
lower level - in some cases perhaps even product-by-product, and even there, there are likely regional
differences in how and when the approach is implemented. The three questions:
" How involved does as a company want to be the services that surround their products?
* If a company chooses to be involved in services, how deeply do they want to be involved?
e Whether the services are provided by the product company or others in their capability chain,
how should the financial transactions for the product-service system be bundled and
structured?
We'll un-pack those three questions, and tie them to the examples we have seen.
131 For more information on Boeing, please see Appendix A.
132 See http://www.industryweek.com/articles/boeing 787 a matter of materials --
special report anatomy of a supply chain 15339.aspx?Page=2?ShowAll=1. Observed December 1, 2010.
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Question 1: How Involved Does a Company Want to Be in the Services that
Surround their Products?
Figure 39 shows the four options related to level of service involvement that we have seen, and some of
the companies we have seen exhibiting that strategy:
" Leave services to others. In general, this is not the approach that healthy, forward-looking
companies will take, except perhaps in very young or extremely technical markets, but
companies and markets mature. It does not seem likely that a successful company can stay here
for long.
* Partner on services with companies with deep skills in services or products that support
services related to your core products. This has been the approach of Ford and Caterpillar with
their telematics platforms, leveraging Microsoft and Trimble This approach likely has smaller
capital requirements and a shorter runway than the approach the next two choices we'll see,
but as the mature core products seek the cost of capital, what is left for Ford and Caterpillar?
This seems to be a great transitional approach, but if that is the case, then there are some
important issues of intellectually property to handled up front..
* Invest deeply in services. We saw in Chapter 2 that it can be a way to capture or create value.
Best Buy, GM, John Deere (to a lesser extent), GE, and Rolls Royce exemplify this approach -
Best Buy and GE in product-based services, GM and John Deere in information-based services
(specifically in telematics), and Rolls Royce in value-based services. While highlighted in Chapter
4, Rolls Royce is really an excellent example of how the most compelling product-service-
systems fire on all cylinders.
e Divest of commodity products tofocus on services. If your core prod uct market is no longer
a viable business, or you can see a time when it will not be, then this may be the best approach.
The pain of the transition will vary inversely with the foresight involved in making the transition.
In a sentence, that was the IBM approach after their near-death experience in the PC era. As we
saw in Chapter 2, while they still design and make some physical things, they are really a
services company and a software company (i.e., higher-value products) and they have
intentionally de-emphasized commodity hardware.
1 This is likely where we would put P&G's Dry-cleaning and car-washing franchising business if we thought of
them in product terms instead of branding terms.
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Figure 39: Four approaches to the Product-Service Relationship
It may be that these four, in the order they are presented, present more of an evolutionary approach to
services than a choice or decision, and that each one is in fact a natural progression from what came
before it, but if that is true companies can perhaps influence the pace of evolution at the very least.
For those companies that are content to leave it to others or to partner, there is little else to do, except
to continue to re-assess that fundamental question and determine when doing more with the services
that surround their products makes sense or write their own obituary. Even in those cases, however,
choices need to be made on the financial structure of value-based services, which are presented in
Question 3.
For those like IBM that chose to leave products behind (or, more rightly, perhaps managed to adapt and
prosper when they had to leave the product behind), there is not enough information available on how
that unfolds in order to articulate a strategy. They appear to be near or at the frontier of that business
model.
For those that invest in services, there is another choice to make. That leads us to Question 2.
Question 2: If You Are Investing in Services, How Deeply Do You Invest?
Here we have seen four levels as well. They are portrayed in Figure 40:
" In Chapter 2, we saw John Deere exhibit the most basic level in their acquisition and
consolidation of a part of the channel for their construction products into Nortrax. There, they
are capturing value from services that previously went to other companies.
* In Chapter 2, we also saw John Deere take it a little further in the LESCO acquisition and "One
Source" strategy to more tightly integrate products and (a variety of ) services to create new
value.
* In Chapter 2, we saw GE take it another level and use services to protect their product
strategy. We looked at how they broke down some of the boundaries that enable D-l-K-W to
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flow more freely between their "conceive"/"design"/"implement" organizations and their
"operate" organization, as in Figure 15.
0 In Chapter 4, we saw Rolls Royce show what seems to be the most advanced service strategy,
using them to create a feedback mechanism to actually enhance the product core as in Figure
36.
John Deere:
Capture
E xisting Value
John Deere:
Integrate to
Create New
Value
Rolls Royce:
Enhance
Products with
Service
L Feedback
Figure 40: Four Levels of Product-Services Integration
Question 3: How to Package the Product-Service System
In Chapter 4, we saw three possible levels in packaging the product-service system. There are a total of
four options/levels here as well. While we saw them played out in a number of companies in a number
of industries, they are most succinctly told in terms of passenger transportation. They are presented
here in Figure 41.
* Pure product: no financing. Focus entirely on the product and its features (think "car".
* Tie payment to consumption (think "car lease").
* Package other services with the core product in a novel way and match their production with
the consumption and payment (think "taxi cab").
* Leverage either economy of scale in production, or underutilization in consumption or both, to
create a utility. Customers will trade some flexibility for the exceptional value created (think
"subway").
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GE:
Protect the
Products with
Service
E xcellence
Economies of scale & scope. Exploit
consumption-side under-utilization.
Figure 41: How to Structure the Financial Transaction - All Product to All Service
It is important to note that this third question is not additive to the second question. Whether services
are delivered separately, through a partnership, or in an integrated manner, questions around bundling
and pricing come into play.
It is also important to remember that for the cab driver, the value-based service model allows him to
charge a premium over the core product, but for Microsoft, value-based services are destroying the
premium they have enjoyed.
As companies come to terms with those three questions, they will start to understand their approach to
product-service systems.
5.4 - For Further Study
Although all of the content herein was prepared specifically for the thesis, this thesis is in many ways
almost a collection of related papers by the same author. Most of the topics presented here, as Services
Science evolves, are worthy of much more consideration than I was able to give them. The following are
some of areas I would study further.
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A Rigorous Definition and Consistent Classification
Probably the most important research to be done in this space is settling on a definition and
classification framework. I feel strongly the taxonomy of complex systems by de Weck and Magee in
Table 1 is an excellent basis for that. It would be interesting to extend the work here which is focused
on the operand to the processes as well. Work to tease out the nature of energy-based services would
be interesting as well...I struggled to find those.
D-I-K-W for Services
I think the applicability of the Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom hierarchy toward services could
help as a basis for classification and insight as well. A more thorough treatment of that idea could yield
real insight. In general, business and academia would benefit from more crisp and consistent use of
those four terms as well.
Services and the Double Helix.
I would like to see the work of Professor Fine and Dr. Piepenbrock from MIT Sloan applied to services.
Extending the work of Professor Fine, Dr. Piepenbrock writes about the four core markets of a business
(capital, labor, supplier, and customers) becoming integral and modular over time. I have wondered if a
similar lifecycle could be observed in the classifications of services that we see here. The pendulum
trend that I discuss briefly in chapter one between products and services for things like music seems to
fit in this space of ideas. Earlier versions of Chapter 4 attempted to wrestle with those notions, but that
ended up on the cutting room floor as it was a distraction from the core message of the thesis.
Professor Fine's view of a capability chain is great language for discussing services outside of the "walls"
of the product company as well.
Product-Based Services: Logistics as a Competitive Advantage
In Chapter 3, I spent a good deal of time on consumer- and retail-centric notions, and then some time
discussing other fairly customer-facing services, but in a more industrial setting. For industrial
companies, services around logistics are a huge part of what they do. Studying those in this context
could be very useful. While there is an excellent body of knowledge around logistics, I am wondering if
it would be seen differently when thought of in terms of product-service systems and not services to
move products.
Advanced Products and Services in Mature Product Markets
In Chapter 3, I briefly look at the financials of Caterpillar, CNH, and Trimble and propose that Caterpillar
and companies like that are deploying all the capital so that Trimble and others can scoop up the gravy.
Exploring that notion more broadly - specifically around the IT element of advanced, complex build-to-
order electromechanical systems (planes, tractors, combines, backhoes, articulated haulers, etc.) - and
who is making the money in those industries would be very interesting. That subject caught my
attention early on, but as a Deere employee, there was no way I could separate business an academic
interests (and sources...for public consumption) well.
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Appendix A - Selected Company
Backgrounds
Throughout the thesis, a number of companies are discussed. To balance ease of reading with
completeness, brief summaries of each company - where appropriate - are presented here instead of in
the body of the paper.
In general, where a company was just mentioned in passing, they are not mentioned here. Where the
details of the company's business are useful background to the thesis, they are included.
For more extensive information on these companies or information on the companies not listed, you
can consult the Internet. I have tried to make this appendix just supporting information, so that the
body of the thesis can be read for people familiar with the companies. Information that can be found in
places like the company's "About Us" or "Company History" or "Investor Relations" pages, or in their
most recent Annual Report or SEC 10-K filing are not cited. The reader is assumed to be web-literate.
For institutions, like MIT or DARPA, or newspapers like the Wall Street Journal or the New York Times, I
have not listed them here when they are acting like institutions. When they are a part of product
development activities, I have mentioned them.
A few more details:
* Companies are listed alphabetically.
* All Market capitalizations are as of November 30, 2010 plus or minus two days.
* All revenue and income statistics are for FY2009.
* Some financial data was obtained at http://finance.yahoo.com.
* Financial values throughout are reported as they are denominated by the company, but always
expressed parenthetically in United States dollars as well. Currency conversion was done using
http://www.xe.com/ucc/ and the rates were observed November 30, 2010 plus or minus two
days. To determine the conversion rate used, you are welcome to do the math. Since
currencies move, the dollar values will not be quite right for what they were at the end of the
fiscal year. That is why the native denominations are preserved.
In general this is just background information. The "good stuff" is in the body of the thesis.
AGCO Corporation (AGCO) http://www.agco.com NYSE: AG
Revenue: $6.6B Net Income: $0.14B Market Capitalization: $4.2B
AGCO is the result of a host of agricultural acquisitions. Its implement brands in the US are the Challenger line
(acquired from Caterpillar in 2002) and Massey-Ferguson (acquired in 1995). The Massey-Ferguson brand's roots
go back to 1847, just ten years later than John Deere.
There are a dozen other brands in the AGCO portfolio, mostly brought about through acquisitions, and not all of
which are sold in the US.
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Amazon.com Inc. (Amazon) http://www.amazon.com NASDAQ: AMZN
Revenue: $24.7B Net Income: $902M Market Capitalization: $78.83B
Amazon.com was born in the mid-1990s. Initially, it was focused on being the world's largest bookstore, but in
years since, it has moved on to sell almost everything. They are an online discount retailer with an incredible
logistics network and an obsessive customer focus.
Their Kindle e-reader has defined its market.
Best Buy Co. Inc. http://www.bestbuy.com NYSE: BBY
Revenue: $49.690B Net Income: $1.3B Market Capitalization: $17B
Best Buy is an electronics and media retailer with a strong US presence and a growing presence in Europe. They
are the last one standing in what used to be a very crowded sector. They continue to diversify the product and
service offerings but are most focused on electronic gadgets, home entertainment systems, and PCs. Much more
is said about them in the thesis.
Blockbuster Inc. http://www.blockbuster.com
Revenue: Net Income: Market Capitalization:
Blockbuster declared bankruptcy early this year. Their aging brick-and-mortar video rental business is seeking
protection to re-structure their debt obligations. They are the largest movie rental chain store in America but that
is starting to sound like being the biggest buggy whip maker in the 1920s. They have experimented with other
distributions channels to compete with Netflix and Redbox, but it may have too little, too late.
Since they are in the midst of re-capitalization effort, FY 2009 financial statistics are omitted as they will not
accurately portray their present condition.
Boeing Co. http://www.boeing.com -NYSE: BA
Revenue: $68.28B Net Income: $1.3B Market Capitalization: $46.78B
Boeing is one of two large commercial jet liner producers left, along with the European company, Airbus.
Bombardier Inc. http://www.bombardier.com TSE: BBD
Revenue: Net Income: Market Capitalization:
Bombardier has two operating divisions: Jets and Rolling stock. Bombardier is one of three manufacturers of
regional (business) jets, along with Saab and Embraer
Circuit City Inc.
Revenue: Net Income: Market Capitalization:
Circuit City was Best Buy's main competitor in the highly competitive consumer electronics business. Increased
competitive pressures and the macro-economic condition of 2008 and 2009 drove it to bankruptcy, but it had been
struggling for years before that. Since it is out of business, no financial data is provided
Caterpillar Inc. (Cat) http://www.cat.com NYSE: CAT
Revenue: $32.4B Net Income: $895M Market Capitalization: $53.7B
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Caterpillar was founded in 1925 as the Caterpillar Tractor Co. but has roots in collaboration between its founders
dating back to the 1890s. Caterpillar is a global firm whose products are focused primarily on construction
equipment, forestry equipment, mining equipment and engines. Those core product offerings are supported by a
strong dealer network, financial services, and a host of other supporting brands and businesses to amplify those
core assets. Caterpillar is one of the largest construction equipment companies in the world. Its 2009 revenue was
markedly down from previous years as a result of the global recession, but it still stayed profitable. Caterpillar
offers a full line of construction equipment, featuring 28 different product types and over 300 different machine
models.
Caterpillar is headquartered in downtown Peoria, Illinois.
CNH Global N.V. http://www.cnh.com NYSE: CNH
Revenue: $13.76B Net Income: - $190M Market Capitalization: $9.86B
CNH Global N.V. (more commonly known as Case-New Holland or CNH) is result of the 1999 merger between Case-
IH and New Holland. (http://www.cnh.com) Case-IH was the result of a previous earlier merger between Case and
International Harvester. The Italian company, the Fiat Group owns 90% of CNH. Fiat Group (Milan: F.MI) is the
home to iconic car brands like Fiat, Alfa Romeo, Maserati, and Ferrari. It is also the parent company of Chrysler
after the 2009 government bail-out.
Coinstar Inc. http://www.coinstar.com NASDAQ: CSTR
Revenue: $1.14B Net Income: $53.6M Market Capitalization: $2.04B
Coinstar operates vending machines. Their core business in coin-counting machines along the fourth wall of retail
establishments that will count coins for a fee or pay out in gift cards for no fee. They are also the parent company
of Redbox, which they acquired from McDonald's. Redbox is well more than half of their revenue. There are now
over 25,000 Redbox movie kiosks. They rent DVDs for $1/day.
Deere & Company (John Deere, Deere) http://www.deere.com NYSE: DE
Revenue: $23.1B Net Income: $874M Market Capitalization: $31.66B
John Deere was founded by the eponymous blacksmith in 1837. Deere is organized into three operating divisions:
Ag & Turf equipment, Construction & Forestry equipment, and Financial Services. Within both of the equipment
divisions are supporting business, like John Deere Parts, John Deere Water, John Deere Landscapes, and the
Intelligent Solutions Group. As did Caterpillar, John Deere spread from its Midwestern roots in the last half of the
20th century to become a global firm. Also like Caterpillar, its robust dealer network is a key advantage and
differentiator.
John Deere is often second to Caterpillar for sales in earth-moving equipment markets where they compete
directly. John Deere is usually largest where the firms compete on forestry equipment. While John Deere's total
construction offerings are not as wide as Caterpillar, it is one of a few companies - along with Caterpillar - to offer
a full line of earth-moving equipment.
John Deere is the world's largest manufacturer of agricultural equipment. They are headquartered on a bucolic,
1,400-acre campus in Moline, Illinois.
Ford Motor Company (Ford) http://www.ford.com NYSE: F
Revenue: $118.B Net Income: $2.72B Market Capitalization: $55.35B
Of the Detroit Three, Ford is the only one that did not need a government bail-out.
General Electric Co. (GE) http://www.ge.com NYSE: GE
Revenue: $156.8B Net Income: $10.7B Market Capitalization: $168.66B
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Tracing its roots to Thomas Edison, few companies have GE's pedigree when it comes to product (and services)
innovation. While they are known for Lightbulbs and appliances, power generation, industrial automation, and
financial services are where they make their money.
General Motors Corporation (GM) http://www.gm.com NYSE: GM (again)
Revenue: Net Income: Market Capitalization: $51.3B
GM had their IPO over the course of writing this thesis. They are back from the dead and re-capitalized. Since
they died in 2009, I am not listing revenue or net income since they will not be representative.
Google Inc. (Google, Google.com) http://www.google.com NASDAQ: GOOG
Revenue: $23.65B Net Income: $6.5B Market Capitalization: $186.5B
Google is one of many mid-1990s-idea-from-a-couple-of-Stanford-grad-students company. Their simple idea was
to make the Internet searchable. Their 2009 Annual Report still describes their ultimate goal as "[c]reating the
perfect search engine." While the offerings of Google are impressive, their revenue comes primarily from their
AdSense platform, with ads accounting for over 90%, and with over 70% of resources committed to search and
ads. Practically speaking, they do not have a traditional product...they are almost pure services.
In. de Diseno Textil (Inditex) MCE: ITX.MC
Revenue: 11.08B / $14.4B Net Income: C1.32B / $1.7B Market Capitalization: C36.19B / $47.03B
Zara is a global fashion company that competes head-to-head with Benetton, Gap, and the Limited in the 18-35
value-sensitive clothing fashion market (Christopher, 2000). It is headquartered in Spain.
It is a part of the Inditex Group. They have other brands, but Zara represents about three-fourths of the business.
About half of their business is inside of Spain. Half is spread throughout the rest of the world.
Intel Corporation http://www.intel.com NASDAQ: INTC
Revenue: $35.127B Net Income: $4.369B Market Capitalization: $119.3B
In 1968, Bob Noyce and Gordon Moore - of "Moore's Law" fame - left Fairchild Semiconductor to found venture
capital-backed Intel. Intel - like Microsoft - was hand-picked by IBM to lead us into the PC era. The success of the
x86 processor architecture has been staggering. Its role in the industry has never been to be the best CPU. It has
always focused on the best value. While there were RISC systems that outperformed Intel offerings as they began
to scale workstation- and server-class systems, their price-performance curve has been largely unassailable.
AMD has become a legitimate contended in the PC and server market, and Intel was a little slow to the party with
mobile devices.
Intel has two greatest strengths are their rigorous manufacturing processes, and their understanding of the
importance of platform architectures.
International Business Machines Corp. (IBM) http://www.ibm.com (NYSE: IBM)
Revenue: $95.758B Net Income: $13.43B Market Capitalization: $175.74B
IBM is discussed extensively in the body of the thesis. Few if any companies have executed as consistent and
robust a services strategy of IBM.
Rolls-Royce Group PLC (Rolls Royce) http://www.rolls-royce.com LSE: RR.L
Revenue: E10.414B / $16.218B Net Income: E2.217B / $3.453B Market Capitalization:
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The Rolls Royce automotive brand is now a part of BMW. This Rolls Royce makes jet engines (among other things).
They compete with GE and Pratt & Whitney, supplying engines to Boeing, Airbus, Saab, Embraer, and Bombardier
in that space. They have four divisions, all focused on power product: civil aero, defense aero, marine power, and
oil & gas platform power.
Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft) http://www.microsoft.com NASDAQ: MSFT
Revenue: $62.484B Net Income: $18.76B Market Capitalization: $216.1B
Microsoft is a fighter and an innovator. The Windows platform is under attack from Apple. The whole PC
ecosystem is under attack from Google and the cloud. For 25 years, they have been a money-making machine.
Netflix Inc. http://www.netflix.com NASDAQ: NFLX
Revenue: $1.67B Net Income: $116M Market Capitalization: $10.39B
Netflix serves about 12M customers with movies in their home delivered via DVD through the mail or streaming
over the Internet. By not keeping a store front and centralizing their inventory to a few DCs, they are able to tap
into the long tail of viewing interests in a way that brick-and-mortar stores cannot.
QUALCOMM Incorporated ihttp://www.qualcomm.com NASDAQ: QCOM
Revenue: $10.99B Net Income: $3.247B Market Capitalization: $75.74
The CDMA chipset is at the heart of their business as its designer and supplier. The also have substantial
intellectual property in the 3G world. No matter who's phone, they are making money. They are fab-less and have
sold off their earlier base station and handset businesses and continue to be focused on the chips.
They were founded in 1985 and are based in San Diego, California.
Rolls Royce I http://www.rollsroycegroup.com LSE: RR.L
Revenue: E10.1B ($15.7B) Net Income: E915M ($1.43B) Market Capitalization:
Rolls Royce Group (LSE: RR.L) is a premier provider of power systems for land, air, and sea. They provide globally
to both civil and military consumers. They characterize their four markets as civil aerospace, military aerospace,
marine, and oil & gas (platforms). They boast over 54,000 gas turbines in service. With a firm order book of
E58.3B ($90.9B) at the end of 2009, their future outlooks continue to be positive. They have over 38,000
employees worldwide
Rolls Royce cars are made by BMW.
Salesforce.com http://www.salesforce.com NASDAQ: CRM
Revenue: $1.3B Net Income: $80.7M Market Capitalization: $18.22B
While they may not have been the first, Salesforce.com commercialized cloud computing and SaaS. They offer flat
fee, Internet-delivered Customer Relationship Management software-as-a-service. They since expanded to offer a
fuller platform as a part of the Force.com API.
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TOPCON Positioning Systems (TPS) http://www.topconpositioning.com PNK: TOPCF
Revenue: Y94.86B / $1.02B Net Income: Y133M / $1.44M Market Capitalization:
TOPCON Positioning Systems sells precision grading solutions that can be used on both Caterpillar and John Deere
equipment. It is a subsidiary of the Japanese Company, TOPCON. The rest of its products are focused on precision
optical
TOPCON Positioning Systems is based in Livermore, CA.
Trimble Navigation Ltd. (Trimble) http://www.trimble.com NASDAQ: TRMB
Revenue: $1.1B Net Income: $63.5M Market Capitalization: $4.47B
Trimble is an important component of the construction and agricultural telematics ecosystems. Charlie Trimble
and two of his colleagues stepped out on their own in Palo Alto in 1978 to develop a company expanding on work
they had done together at Hewlett Packard (discussed elsewhere) providing location services based on LORAN
technology. They acquired that technology from Hewlett Packard, and for over three decades since then, Trimble
has stayed focused on location-based products and services.
Their growth model has been similar to that of Cisco Systems in that they have grown in part through strategic
acquisitions. Those acquisitions have both strengthened their core technical excellence, as well as opened up
natural adjacent and supporting markets required to expand or defend their position.
Trimble is based in Sunnyvale, California.
Zipcar http://www.zipcar.com
Revenue: Net Income: Market Capitalization:
The largest car-sharing company in America. As with most (all?) car-sharing projects, Zipcar is still not profitable.
They are discussing an IPO.
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